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Incompetents and the Right
to Die: In Search of Consistent
Meaningful Standards
BY MARK STRASSER*

INTRODUCTION

Competent patients have the right to refuse medical treatment
including artificial nutrition and hydration, even if that refusal will
ultimately lead to their deaths.' Incompetent patients are said to have the
same rights as competent patients, although those rights obviously cannot
be exercised m the same way.2 The particular mechanisms by which

those rights can be exercised have generated some controversy, both m
their substantive content and m the rationales used to justify their
existence. Regrettably, the lack of a coherent rationale has led to a variety
of competing and ultimately incompatible rationales and policies.
The two most frequently discussed paradigms for medical decisionmaking for incompetents are substituted judgment and best interests.
Regrettably, the standards are used inconsistently, both with respect to
when and to how they are employed. This lack of consistency thwarts
rather than promotes the goals which these standards are designed to
N

* Astant Professor, Capital Umversity Law and Craduate Center. B.A. 1977,

Harvard College; Ph.D 1984, Umversity of Chicago; J.D. 1993, Stanford Law SchooL
The author thanks George Cronhenn for his helpful discussions of these and related
mssues.
2

See nfjra notes 2-7 and accompanymg text.
See infra notes 25-66 and accompanynug text.
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achieve. Unless these standards are clarified, the number of pointless
prolongations and premature cessations of life will only increase.
Part I of this Article discusses incompetents and the right to bodily
integrity.' If indeed competents and incompetents have the same rights
to bodily integrity, it is important for courts or legislatures to make clear
what those rights include and how they are to be implemented. Currently,
neither is particularly clear. Part II discusses the two tests commonly used
to determine when treatment may be withdrawn from incompetent
patients - substituted judgment and best interests The courts' conflation
of these tests, which have different criteria and different goals, may
ultimately undermine the very purposes which these tests are designed to
serve. Part IH discusses the roles of family and the courts in the
decisionmaking process,' examines the legal definition of death, and
analyzes the current system of liability for medical personnel and
institutions.' The Article suggests a modification which would not only
bring this area of medical jurisprudence into line with other areas of
medical jurisprudence, but also do much to assure that patients' wishes
7
are actually carried out.
I. INCOMPETENTS AND THE RIGHT TO BODILY INTEGRrTY
A.

Right to Bodily Integrity

The right to bodily integrity has long been recognized. In Union
Pacific v. Botsford, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized: "No right is held
more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the
right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person,
free from all restraint or interference of others .... " In Natanson v.
Kine, the Supreme Court of Kansas suggested that competent adults may
"expressly prohibit the performance of life-saving surgery or other
medical treatment."' Numerous other state supreme courts have also
recognized that the right to bodily autonomy includes the right to refuse
medical treatment.0

' See infra notes 8-66 and accompanying text.
' See infra notes 67-236 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 237-354 and accompanying text.
6
See infra notes 296-354 and accompanying text.
7
See infra notes 237-354 and accompanying text and pp. 152-54.
1 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
9 350 P.2d 1093, 1104 (Kan. 1960).
"0See, e.g., Mitchell ex rel. Rasmussen v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674, 681-82 (Adz.
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The right to refuse treatment does not merely include the right to

refuse highly invasive or very risky procedures; it also includes the right
to refuse artificial hydration and nutrition." Thus, informed, autonomous
individuals can refuse artificially delivered food and liquids even if that

refusal will ultimately lead to their own deaths. 2 This Article addresses
neither the wisdom of including artificial nutrition and hydration within
the category of medical treatment nor of allowing people to starve to

death while denying them assistance in achieving a quicker and more
painless death.' Rather, this Article discusses which policies are

1987) (explaining that the right to privacy encompasses the right to refuse medical
treatment); In re Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 9-13 (a. 1990) (finding that a competent
person has the right to refuse medical treatment); In re Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292, 297
(IlL. 1989) (explaining that Illinois common law permits the patient to refuse medical
treatment); Leach v. Akron Gen. Medical Ctr., 426 N.E.2d 809, 814 (Ohio 1980)
(explaining that a terminally ill patient has the right to refuse medical treatment); In re
Grant, 747 P.2d 445, 455 (Wash. 1987) (recognizing the right of the terminally ill patient
to have life-sustaining treatment withheld); In re L.W., 482 N.W.2d 60, 65-66 (Wis.
1992) (noting that the state constitution guarantees an individual's right to refuse medical

treatment).
" See Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 300 (1986) ("[A] patient has the
right to refuse any medical treatment or medical service, even when such treatment is
labelled 'furnishing nourishment and hydration."); Longeway, 549 N.E.2d at 297 ("[l]n
Illinois, the common law right to refise medical treatment includes ...artificial nutrition
and hydration."); In re Lawrance, 579 N.E.2d 32, 39 (Ind. 1991) ("[Ihe administration
of artificial nutrition and hydration ... is medical treatment which can be refused.);
Delio v. Westchester County Medical Ctr., 516 N.Y.S.2d 677, 689 (1987) (explaining that
medical procedures providing nutrition and hydration are evaluated in the same manne
as other types of life-sustaining procedures); Grant,747 P.2d at 455 ("[Tihe right of a
terminally ill patient to have life sustaining procedures withheld includes the right to
withhold nasogastric tubes, intravenous feeding, and other artificial means of nutrition and

hydration.").

12Linda Carl, Comment, The Right to Voluntary Euthanasia, 10 WHrrMI
L.REV.
489, 494 (1988) (explaining that the patient may control the course of her own life and

death).
'3 HELGA KUHSE, TIM SANCIrTY-OF-LM DOCram INMEDICINE A CRMQUE 201
(1987) (criticizing the view that passive but not active euthanasia is acceptable); George
P. Smith, I, All's Well thatEnds Well: Toward a Policy ofAssisted Ratonal Suicide or
Merely Enlightened Self-Determination?, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 275, 342 (1989)
(pointing out that withdrawal of treatment does not always result in a swift and painless
death); see also Famam v. Crista Ministries, 807 P.2d 830, 848 (Wash. 1991) (Dore, C.J.,

concurring in part dissenting in part) (suggesting that lethal injection is 'less painful and,
therefore, more human " than death by starvation and dehydration). For an extended
discussion of this issue, see Mark Strasser, Assisted Suicide and the Competent,
Terminally Ill: On Ordinary reatments and Extraordinary Policies, OR. L REV.
(forthcoming Summer 1995).
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appropriate for each state to adopt for incompetent patients, given its
current policies concerning competent patients.
B.

Who Is Incompetent?

Before an analysis of the appropriate paradigm for medical decisionmaking for incompetents can be offered, it must first be established who
in fact is incompetent. Individuals who are unconscious, traumatized,
senile, disoriented, overly emotional, or simply too young may all be held
incompetent. 14 Basically, the standard for a finding of competency is
whether, "at the time and under the circumstances when his consent is
required, [the patient has] the mental ability to make a rational, deliberate
decision regarding the proposed treatment."' 5 That determination is a
question of fact."
As a general matter, no universally accepted set of criteria exists to
determine which people are competent and which are not.'" Even when
subscribing to the basic principle that competency involves the ability to
make rational, deliberate decisions," courts use different specific criteria
to determine whether in fact that ability is present.
Suppose that a patient has the ability to understand what the doctor
has said but nonetheless offers an irrational reason to justify a seemingly
irrational decision. A court might hold that the individual was not
competent, appearances to the contrary notwithstanding. Indeed, a court
might reject that even a patient who can give a reasonable justification for
her treatment decision is in fact able to weigh the various options
appropriately.'9
Se
e4 DAVID W. Mm,
MEDICO-LEGAL IMPuCATIONS OF DEATH AND DYING §
6:8, at 109 (1981); id. § 11:3, at 267.
'sId. § 6:8, at 110.
16Id. § 6:8, at 109.
17 For

a discussion of some of the different criteria for competency, see HEALTH

LAW 1104-11 (Barry R. Furrow et al. eds., 2d ed. 1991). See also Susan R. Martyn &
Lynn B. Jacobs, Legislating Advance Directives for the Terminally Ill: The Living Will
and Durable Power of Attorney, 63 NE. L. REv. 779, 782 (1984) (finding no clear
dividing line between competence and incompetence in case law).
"' Stephen C. Kenney, Death and Life Decisions: Who Is in Control?, 23 LOY. LA.
L. REV. 791, 801 (1990) (noting that the three prerequisites for informed consent are the
capacity to reason, voluntariness, and a clear understanding of the risks and benefits).
'9As the court explained in In re Jeffers, 606 N.E.2d 727, 732 (1. App. Ct. 1992):
[We disagree that merely presenting a purportedly nondeluded reason for
refusing the medication shows that respondent has the ability to make a
reasoned decision. In addition, the mere fact that respondent understood the
options available does not mean that she has the ability to appropriately balance
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Courts can make use of expert testimony when making a competency
determination. Yet experts themselves may have difficulty in ascertaining
whether individuals are competent Thus, two doctors interviewing the
same patient might disagree about that individual's competency. 0 When
a patient's competency is disputed, the courts must make the ultimate
decision. 2'

Given the difficulties of ascertaining whether someone is competent,
"[a] person is presumed to be competent unless shown by the evidence
not to be competent." Further, the wisdom of the patient's decision
cannot itself be the sole determinant of whether the person is competent;

merely because someone makes an unwise decision does not make her
incompetentO
While difficulties sometimes arise in determining whether an
individual is in fact competent, in many cases no such difficulty exists.

A person who is not conscious simply cannot make the requisite decision.
Society must decide how medical treatment decisions will be made for
individuals who cannot make those decisions for themselves.

C. Treating Competents and Incompetents Equally
If competent patients have the right to refuse treatment, then it might
seem unfair not to extend the same right to incompetents. u Each class
those options and make a reasoned decision.
20 The court in In re Quackenbush, 383 A.2d 785, 788 (N.J. Morris County CL
1978), was confronted with this problem.
Dr. Lenmer is of the opinion, based upon reasonable medical certainty, that
Quackenbush has the mental capacity to make decisions, to understand the
nature and extent of his physical condition, to understand the nature and extent
of the operations, to understand the risks involved if he consents to the
operation, and to understand the risks involved if he refuses the operation.
However, "Dr. Giuliano ...concluded that Quackenbush's mental condition was not
sufficient to make an informed decision concerning the operation." Id.
2
Robert M. Bym, Compulsory Lifesaving Treatmentfor the Competent Adult, 44
FORDRAM L. REV. 1, 32 (1975) ("[D]oubts as to competency must be resolved
judicially"); Paul J. Liacos, Is "SubstitutedJudgment" a Valid Legal Concept?, 5 IssUES
L. & MED. 215, 223 (1989).
2 Lane v. Candura, 376 N.E.2d 1232, 1235 (Mass. App. Ct. 1978).
23Id at 1236 ("The law protects her right to make her own decision to accept or
reject treatment, whether that decision is wise or unwise."); MEYERS, supra note 14, §
11:2, at 266 (explaining that a rational decision need not be "reasonable").
2 MEYERS, sapra note 14, § 11:6, at 274 ("If competent individuals may refuse
lifesaving medical treatment, absent overriding state interests in compelling treatment,
then the same right should be accorded to those who are not competent').
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consists of individuals worthy of respect.' Yet the two classes are
relevantly dissimilar. By definition, incompetent patients cannot perform
the deliberative processes which are prerequisites for informed, autono-

mous decisionmaking.

Arguably, individuals who are incapable of

deliberating cannot be said to have a right of self-determination
They
themselves cannot currently determine what treatments they will or will
not have because, quite simply, they lack that capacity.' It is not clear
that it makes any sense to talk about a right which cannot be exercised.
" Id. ("It is axiomatic that the value of human dignity and bodily integrity extends
to all human beings, whether thought to be mentally competent or not.'); John A.
Robertson, Cruzan and the Constitutional Status of Nontreatment Decisions for
Incompetent Patients, 25 GA. L. REV. 1139, 1159 (1991) ("[E]qual respect for
incompetent patients requires that they have a right to have a proxy refuse treatment on

their behalf.").
2 Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 280 (1990) ('An
incompetent person is not able to make an informed and voluntary choice to exercise a
hypothetical right to refuse treatment or any other right"); DouGlAs N. WALTON, ETHICS
OF WnTHDRAWAL OF LIFE-SuPPORT SYSTEMS 107 (1983) ("The model of informed
consent to medical treatment is predicated on the conception of a free moral agent
operating on a knowledgeable appreciation of the available alternatives and then, by a
process of rational deliberation, choosing among those alternatives.'); Thomas W. Mayo,
Constitutionalking the 'ght to Die," 49 MD.L. REV. 103, 146 (1990) ("[Olnce a
patient is incompetent (at least once irreversibly so), his or her status is incompatible with
notions of autonomy and personal decision-making."); Tracy L. Merritt, Note, Equality
for the Elderly Incompetent: A Proposalfor Dignified Death, 39 STAN. L. REV. 689, 704
(1987) ("By definition, the incompetent cannot make free choices and exercise his
individual autonomy.').
' In re Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292, 304 ML. 1989) (Ward, J., dissenting) (suggesting
that "conceptual and practical difficulties" exist in discussing the right of incompetent
persons to refuse medical care); Allen E. Buchanan, The Limits ofProxy Decisionmaking
for Incompetents, 29 UCLA L. REv. 386, 394 (1981) ("The very notions of selfdetermination, and hence a right of self-detenmination, only apply to a being who
possesses, or has the potential for developing, certain complex cognitive functions,
including the ability to conceive of the future, discern alternative courses of action, and
make judgments about his own good."); Mayo, supra note 26, at 146; Robertson, supra
note 25, at 1160 ('rmhe right to consent to or refuse medical care is also dependent on
some minimum degree of mental functioning. Unless a person has the capacity to
recognize alternatives and make choices, a claim that she has the right to refuse treatment
makes no sense."); Victor G. Rosenblum & Clark D. Forsythe, The Right to Assisted
Suticide: Protection of Autonomy or an Open Door to Social Killing?, 6 ISSUES L. &
MED. 3, 19 (1990) ("[Tjhe sine qua non of a right to 'choose' anything is cognitive ability
to choose.").
"'Robertson, supra note 25, at 1160 (An incompetent person cannot herself exercise
the right to refuse treatment because the exercise of this right requires the mental capacity
to be aware of the situation, to understand the alternatives and to make a choice.").
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Courts have recognized that incompetents are relevantly dissimilar to
competents' but have nonetheless held that incompetent patients do not
lose their rights merely because of an inability to exercise them' 0 Yet,
it becomes important to spell out the right which the incompetents still
enjoy. Is it the right to self-determination or the right to have current
interests and welfare promoted?3 Making clear the content of the right
has important implications for the mechanisms by which treatment
decisions are made. If incompetents have the right to have their current
welfare interests taken into account but do not have the right to have their
past expressed preferences respected, then living wills would be quite
unimportant if not totally irrelevant.Y Alternatively, if incompetents
have the right to have their previously expressed preferences taken into
account in any current treatment decisions, then an incompetent's
previously signed living will would be quite relevant.O

29 Drabick v. Drabick, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840, 854 (Ct. App. 1988) (suggesting that a
claim that the patient who is in a noncognitive state has a "right to choose" is a "legal

fiction').
30In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1247 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (en bane) ("This right of bodily

integrity belongs equally to persons who are competent and persons who are not Further,
it matters not what the quality of a patient's life may be; the right of bodily integrity is
not extinguished simply because someone is ill, or even at death's door.'"; Join F.
Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921, 924 (Fla. 1984) (suggesting that

the "valuable right [of self-determination] should not be lost because the noncognitive and
vegetative condition of the patient prevents a conscious exercise of the choice to refuse

further extraordinary treatment); In re Roe, 421 N.E.2d 40, 51 (Mass. 1981) ("To deny
this right [to refis treatment] to persons who are incapable of exercising it personally

is to degrade those whose disabilities make them wholly reliant on other, more fortunate,
individuals:; In re Spring, 399 N.E.2d 493, 498 (Mass. 1979) (explaining that
incompetents do not lose the right to choose by virtue of their incompetence); In re
Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (NJ. 1976) (noting that the only way to prevent destruction

of an incompetent's right is to let the gumdia exercise it); MEYERs, supra note 14, §
11:4, at 269 ("The substituted judgment rule is grounded in the theory that the
incompetent patient has the same rights and prerogatives as the competent patient to
refuse lifesaving medical care.').
31Robertson, supra note 25, at 1167-68 ("The incompetent patient has a right to
have her interests and present welfare respected... -".
32 See Nancy K. Rhoden, Litigating Life and Death, 102 HARV. L. REV. 375, 378
(1988) ("W[f the values held when the patient was conscious are no longer relevant to a
decision based on her current interests, thn even values encapsulated in a living will
would be, if not equally irrelevant, at least far from determinative:).

"But see Rebecca Dresser, Life, Death, and Incompetent Paients: Conceptual
Infirmities and Hidden Values in the Law, 28 ARIZ. L. REV. 373, 394 (1986) (arguing
that respecting a living will involves the decision to respect past rather than current
self).
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Part of the difficulty in making headway in determining the process
by which medical decisions for incompetents should be made is that it is
unclear which decisionmaking paradigm is most useful. The most
frequently debated paradigms are best interests and autonomy, the latter
allegedly being represented in the substituted judgment procedure.'
It is unclear which paradigm to use because incompetents share some
but not other features with competent individuals; they may at one time
have been able to make informed, deliberate decisions about a variety of
issues, but they cannot do so currently. Precisely because some features
are shared while others are not it is clear that any adopted paradigm will
need modification.
Suppose that one decides to adopt the medical decisionmaking
paradigm for competents but to tailor it to the abilities of incompetent
patients. As an initial matter, it might seem unclear what modifications
could make the paradigm useful in cases where there is no currently
competent informed individual to make decisions about her own health
care. Indeed, some commentators suggest that if the necessary conditions
for current autonomous decisionmaking cannot be met by the patient,
then it does not make sense to talk about that patient's right of selfdetermination."
'4 Mitchell ex rel. Rasmussen v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674, 688 (Ariz. 1987) ("Courts
have developed two standards to guide surrogate decisionaking: 'substituted judgment'
and 'bestinterests."'); In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 456 (N.J. 1987) (Handler, J.,
concurring)
(discussing the "two major approaches to the making of medical treatment decisions for
incompetent patients..
[ole focus[ing] upon the patient's right of self-determination,
the other emphasiz[ing] the patient's best interests"); In re Guardianship of Myers, 610
N.E.2d 663, 669 (C.P. Summit Co. Ohio 1993) ("CGardianship law has traditionally
recognized tvo methods, the best interest test ... and 'substitute judgment."').
31See, e.g., Edward D. Robertson, Jr., Is "Substituted Judgment" a Valid Legal
Concept?, 5 IssuEs L. & ME]). 197, 206 (1989) ("Incompetent persons are not
autonomous; they have no ability to decide. Substituted judgment [for them] thus requires
the acceptance of an oxymoron - that one's autonomy can be exercised by another."); see
also Donald L. Beschle, Autonomous Decisionmaking and Social Choice: Examining the
"Rightto Die,"77 KY. L.J. 319, 328 (1988-1989) (describing the "attempt to approximate
the [incompetent] patient's own decision!' as involving "an analytical leap of great
significance"); Buchanan, supra note 27, at 391 ("li]t makes no sense to ascribe a right
of self-determination to certain individuals in irreversible vegetative states."); Sandra S.
Ikuta, Dying at the Right lime: A CriticalLegal Theory Approach to liming-of-Death
Issues, 5 ISSUES LAW & MED. 3, 42 (1989) (finding the notion of substituted judgment
to be logically contradictory); Robertson, supra note 25, at 1160 ("[lit is not meaningful
to speak of an incompetent patient's possession of the same right to refuse tatment that
a competent person possesses.") (emphasis omitted). But see Norman L. Cantor, Quinlan,
Privacy and the Handling of Incompetent Dying Patients, 30 RUTGERS L. REV. 243, 252
(1977) ("Where a patient has, while competent, stated preferences as to course of action
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It is not hard to understand why some commentators adopt that view.
Consider Patient A, a competent individual who consents to a procedure
despite not having been given all relevant information. A doctor who
performs a medical procedure based on that "consenf' may be subject to
liability.' Consider Patient B, who does not give consent for a nonemergency procedure to be performed. The doctor who performs that
medical procedure3 7on Patient B without authorization might also be
subject to liability.
Arguably, the incompetent patient must be likened to Patient A,
Patient B, or both. Insofar as the patient consented to a particular
treatment regimen (for example, through her living will), she did so
without knowing what her current condition would be like - either
because she could not predict what it would be like to have her current
symptoms or, at the very least, because she would not know what it
would be like to be an incompetent with those symptoms.' This
individual would seem like Patient A since she has given her consent
without being fully given all of the relevant information.
Insofar as the incompetent patient did not manifest what she would
have wanted before she in fact became incompetent, she did not give her
consent at all This person should be likened to Patient B. Arguably, any
"decision!' of a now-incompetent person cannot be considered valid
because she gave either uninformed consent or no consent at all 3

during terminal treatment, or where a guardian can discern from prior expressions what
the now incompetent patient would have wanted, self-determination is in fact promoted
by allowing a guardian to implement the patient's wishes.") (citation omitted); Gregory
Gelfand, Euthanasia and the Terminally Ill Patient, 63 NEB. L. REV. 741, 747 (1984)
("[Th]e concept is well established inthe area of probate law that an incompetent person's
rights ought to be protected by allowing someone else to exercise those rights on behalf
of the incompetent person . ..
"See Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093, 1101 (Kan. 1960) (explaining that consent
must be informed to be effective).
31 See Pema v. Perozzi, 457 A.2d 431, 438 (N.J. 1983) (explaining that a doctor
performing non-emergency surgery without consent would be subject to liability); DAvID
CUNDnF, EUraANASLA Is NOT THE ANSWEp A HospicE PHYSIMAN's VIEW 51 (1992);
Merritt, supra note 26, at 699 (explaining that a physician may be subject to tort liability

for treating a patient without first obtaining the patient's informed consent).
"' Cf. Beschle, supra note 35, at 360 (suggesting that in cases involving a prior
declaration not to have extraordinary treatment which is made well in advance, the
declarant is too far removed to make an informed decision).
" James Bopp, Jr. & Daniel Avila, The Due Process 'Wight to Life" in Cruzan and
Its Impact on "Rght-to-Die" Law, 53 U. Prrr. L. REv. 193, 201 (1991) ("An unconscious

person is rendered incompetent by his present lack of consciousness, and by his former
inability to anticipate his present predicament and contemporaneous intent.").
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This argument proves too much. One often makes legally binding
decisions without being fully informed about how one will feel in the
future. An individual who observes others in particular circumstances and
then makes a judgment about whether she would want treatment for
herself under those same circumstances must make a judgment about
whether she believes that life under such circumstances would be
worthwhile, presumably recognizing that she is making her judgment
based on incomplete information.
When an individual previously expressed a desire not to have
treatment in particular circumstances, it is important to know whether the
individual was adequately (even if not "fully") informed and whether the
individual's manifestation accurately reflected her deeply held and
carefully considered views. An individual's articulation of a position
might have involved an unexamined acquiescence in then-current societal
views rather than a reflection of deeply held beliefs; arguably, only
statements running counter to popular societal views should be given
much weight'
Yet, it would be ironic at best to hold that an individual should be
permitted to choose life over death only if most people would not make
that choice. While it is clear that some method must be used to determine
whether the stated preferences actually represent deeply held values, it
would be inappropriate to have a policy in which only those views which
would not be shared by society would be respected.
Suppose that it were possible to determine which of an individual's
articulations accurately reflected that individual's deeply held beliefs. An
individual's spontaneous, ill-considered comments would be discounted,
whereas an individual's carefully considered conclusions about different
treatment scenarios would be given great weight.
Even if one could make this determination, it would not follow that
the patient would continue to hold those beliefs several years after having
made those carefully considered comments.41 People often change their
minds over time. Yet, if the incompetent had changed her mind after
manifesting certain preferences, she would be unable to currently
communicate that change and she might have failed to have communicated that change while competent. Thus, even if there were some way to

' See Beschle, supra note 35, at 362 ("Where the prior statement of the individual
merely reflects prevailing social attitudes, it is ...far less certain that the prior statement
was made for reasons other than its social acceptability.).

41In re Westchester County Medical Ctr. ex rel. O'Connor, 531 N.E.2d 607, 613

(N.Y. 1988) ("[TIhere always exists the possibility that, despite his or her clear
expressions in the past, the patient has since changed his or her mind.").
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determine which of the incompetent's past statements were made only
after careful deliberation, there would be no guarantee that those
statements would accurately reflect what the incompetent would currently
say if able to do so. Arguably, the comments of a previously competent
patient should not be used to determine what she, a currently incompetent
patient, would want because she might have changed her mind without
telling anyone. Were she currently competent, we could require that she
confirm her previous wishes!' Because she is not competent, no
confirmation is possible, and the previous statement must be discounted
if not ignored completely.
An even stronger argument has been offered to show why the
previously articulated wishes of the now-incompetent patient should be
ignored. Even if the patient's previously expressed wishes accurately
represented her wishes at the time of that expression and even if there
had been no subsequent change of mind, the interests of the current,
incompetent person may be much different from those of the past
competent person, even though the same individual is being considered4 3 Further, precisely because the lives of the competent person and
the incompetent person are so qualitatively different; the competent
person could not understand the life of the incompetent and thus could
not make an informed decision about what treatments would be appropriate for such a person. 4 Arguably, having the guardian determine what
values or beliefs the patient once had would be pointless even if
possible4 The guardian should instead seek to determine what would
serve the patient's current interests.'
At least two weaknesses are present in the argument that because of
the competent person's inability to understand what her own life as an
42 But cf. Martyn & Jacobs, supra note 17, at 790 (reporting that a survey found that
only half the patients who drafted directives before becoming terminally ill remained

conscious for the 14 days required after prognosis to revalidate the directve).
4' See Robertson, supra note 25, at 1167-68 ("The incompetent patient has a right
to have her interests and present welfare respected to the extent that she has interests. Her
present welfare is served by treating her in terms of her cunent interests, not in tenna of

interests that she previously had but which are no longer relevant.").
" Beschle, supra note 35, at 350 ("Even if the proxy decision maker quite faithfilly
carries out detailed advance instructions executed by the patient prior to the fatal illness,

the patient was very much a different person at that time").

41 Cf. Westchester County Medical Cr, 531 N.E.2d at 617 (Hancock, J., concuring)
("There is simply no way of excluding the possibility that the patient has had a change
of mind so that her past wishes do not indicate her present wishes.").
4
6Robertson, supra note 25, at 1162 ("[R]espect for the incompetent patient merely
requires that her current interests and welfare be respected .... ).
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incompetent would be like, the patient's autonomy interests must be
ignored and the patient's current best interests must be considered
dispositive. Determining what in fact would be in the incompetent
patient's current best interests may be much easier said than done 7

Presumably, the individuals who are now making that decision are also
unable to understand what the life of the incompetent patient is like. If
indeed the competent person's inability to understand what it is like to be
incompetent implies that she should be barred from making judgments
about her own future care should she become incompetent, then it would
seem that all competent individuals should likewise be barred from
making those judgments for others." Yet, it would hardly be appropriate
for an incompetent person to make treatment decisions for an incompetent
patient. Thus, the above analysis would seem to suggest that no one
should be making treatment decisions for the incompetent patient. If this
absurd result is to be avoided, it will have to be admitted that competent
individuals can appropriately make decisions about the care of the
incompetent. If some competent individuals should be allowed to do so,
it is hard to imagine why the person herself should not be among that
select few.
An additional reason exists for courts to be loath to accept the
rationale barring individuals from making decisions about their own
future medical care. Such a jurisprudence would radically change much
that is currently accepted in law. For example, analogous reasoning would
suggest that individuals should be precluded from disposing of their
property via wills, since they cannot currently know what they will want
in the future. They will have to dispose of their property when the
"appropriate" time comes.49 Those unable to do so at the time of their
deaths would simply lose their rights to dispose of their property in
accord with their wishes, just as the incompetent on the above account
has no right to be treated in accord with the wishes expressed while
competent.

'q . In re Hamlin, 689 P.2d 1372, 1375-76 (Wash. 1984) (pointing out that
decisions must be made on a case-by-case basis concentrating on the best interests of the

specific individual).
C.f Dresser, supra note 33, at 389 ("To base medical decisions on their fonmer
competent preferences or on imputed reasonable person values is to treat [incompetent]
patients in conformance with things that no longer matter to them, and indeed, in potential
disregard of things that do matter to them.").
' See Beschle, supra note 35, at 345 ("[No response can be said to be a genuinely
informed one until the full reality of the choice is present to the individual, that is, until
death has 'come his way.").
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The above analogy is not undermined by the cy pres doctrine, which
permits, in certain circumstances, a court to modify the terms of a will or
trust in order to fulfill the donor's wishes.m While it is true that in such
a case the court does not allow the specific directions of the donor to be
followed because of illegality, impracticality, or impossibility," the
court nonetheless seeks to act in accord with the general intent of the
donor; the court does not ignore the intent of the donor as the above
theory would analogously imply.
Perhaps it could be thought that the intent of the individual could be
taken into account when considering property issues but should not be
taken into account when considering a person's medical care. Yet this
argument is unpersuasive. All else being equal, the more important the
interest, the more important it is for the individual to have her intentions
respected. If it is important that individuals' autonomy be respected in the
disposition of their property, then it is even more important that
individuals' autonomy be respected in something of such vital concern as
their own future medical care.52
The state cannot credibly argue that, because of its great concern that
the incompetent's intent be accurately reflected at the time of the
procedure, the state must ignore all previous manifestations of intent.
Such an argument is especially unpersuasive given that the individual
cannot currently manifest his intent because of his incompetence.
Basically, the state would be arguing that in order to avoid problems with
accurately determining a patient's intent, it would ignore the patient's
manifestations of intent entirely. While the state might justify its refusal
to consider a previous manifestation of intent on other grounds such as
best interests, the state cannot credibly base its refusal to consider any
manifestation of intent out of an alleged concern for the patient's
autonomy.

'0 See In re Gerber, 652 P.2d 937, 940 (Utah 1982) (explaining that cy pies doctrine

allows courts to fulfill the intention of the donor).
"' See Howard Say. Inst. v. Peep, 170 A.2d 39, 42 (N.J. 1961) (explaining that cy
pres is a judicial mechanism which allows a court to apply trust funds to a general
charitable purpose as nearly as possible to the particular purpose of the settlor, when-that
particular purpose has become impossible, impractical, or illegal).
n Norman L. Cantor, A Patient'sDecision to Decline Life-Saving Medical Treatment:
Bodily Integriy Versus the Preservation of Life, 26 RUTGERS L. REV. 228, 241 (1993)
("No more basic aspect of personal privacy can be found than bodily integrity, and this

interest is entitled to concomitant constitutional protection."); Merritt, supra note 26, at
700 ("The right to reject medical treatment represents an extreme example of the exercise
of an important personal decision concerning physical integrity and personal autonomy.").
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The policy that only current manifestations of intent should be
considered valid would have important implications for the treatment of
competent patients. Such a policy would have absurd results, both
medically and legally. For example, it would seem to imply that surgery
could not be performed under general anesthesia. Not only would the
unconscious patient be unable to give consent currently, but (for all the
doctor knows) the patient's desires and intentions might have changed
once the general anesthesia had been administered.53 Further, such a
policy would suggest that an unconscious person who had previously
explicitly rejected having a blood transfusion and whose religion was
known to prohibit such transfusions could nonetheless be subjected to a
transfusion,' because no current refusal of treatment would be present.
Not surprisingly, courts have rejected the claim that a person must be
conscious in order for her right to refuse treatment to be exercised.' 5
Courts are correct to reject the argument that previous manifestations
of intent by living will should be ignored. However, courts must entertain
the possibility that the intention as manifested in the living will does not
accurately represent the individual's last considered judgment about what
she would want done. An individual while competent might change her
mind without also changing her living will Because of this possibility,
courts might employ a rebuttable presumption that the living will
represented the patient's current intent. If there is evidence meeting the

"See Bopp & Avila, supra note 39, at 201 ("Anunconscious person is rendered
incompetent by his present lack of consciousness, and by his former inability to anticipate
his present predicament and contemporaneous intent.").
' While individuals may be prevented from refusing transfusions if their deaths
would orphan their children, individuals are generally allowed to refuse transfusions.
Thus, courts have upheld the patient's refusal of a transfusion as long as the children,
even if young, would still have one parent. See Public Health Trust v. Wons, 541 So. 2d
96, 97-98 (Fla. 1989) (finding that the state's interest in having children raised by two
parents does not oveiride the right to refuse blood transfusions); Norwood Hosp. v.
Munoz, 564 N.E.2d 1017, 1023 (Mass. 1991) (finding that the state's interest in
preserving life does not override the right to refuse transfusion invoked by a Jehovah's
Witness).
" See In re lobes, 529 A.2d 434, 451 (N.J. 1987) ("A incompetent patient does not
lose his or her right to refuse life-sustaining treatment. Where such a patient has clearly
expressed her intentions about medical treatment, they will be respected.") (citation
omitted); In re Eichner, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517, 546 (App. Div. 1980) ("To deny the exercise
because the patient is unconscious is to deny the right.'); Cantor, supra note 35, at 252
('An unconscious person presumably retains the right to be free of government
monitoring or bodily invasion even if the person can no longer sense the invasion of
privacy. Similarly, an unconscious patient ought to be entitled to have a prior choice
honored").
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relevant standard (e.g., clear and convincing evidence)' that the patient
had changed her mind, then the living will might be ignored.
It is reasonable for courts to employ a rebuttable presumption that the
living will represents the competent individual's informed preferences.
When a person makes out a living will, good reason exists to think that
the person is taking the issues seriously.' Further, the person will be on
notice that should she subsequently change her mind, she should clearly
manifest that change." Precisely because of possible subsequent changes
which have not been adequately recorded, however, the living will should

not irrebuttably be presumed to represent the patient's final cofisidered
preferences; other events might have occurred which would lead one to
believe that the individual had indeed changed her mind. ' Nonetheless,
absent contrary evidence, a living will should be given great weight."'

See Ardath A. Hamann, Family Surrogate Laws: A Necessary Suplement to
Livng Wills and Durable Powers of Attorney, 38 VILL. L. REV. 103, 113-114 (1993)
(discussing different proof requirements); Neal F. Splaine, Note, The Incompetent
Individual's Right to Refuse Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment: Legislating Not
Litigating a Profoundly Private Decision, 27 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 905, 939 (1993)

(discussing different burdens of proof).
See ALA. CODE § 22-8A-5(a)(1)-(3) (1975) (outlining methods of revoking a living

will).
5' In re Westchester County Medical Ctr. ex rel. O'Connor, 531 N.E.2d 607, 613
(N.Y. 1988) ("The existence of a writing suggests the author's seriousness of purpose and
ensures that the court is not being asked to make a life-or-death decision based upon
casual remarks."); T-A. Tucker Ronzetti, Comment, Constituting Family and Death
Through the Struggle with State Power: Cnizan v. Director, Missouri Department of
Health, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 149, 198 (1991) ("[The very act of signing a written
document may occasion greater reflection than would be an off-handed remark to a

friend.).
5

9 Westchester County Medical Cir., 531 N.E.2d at 613-14 ("[A] person who has
troubled to set forth his or her wishes in a writing is more likely than one who has not
to make sure that any subsequent changes of heart are adequately expressed, either in a
new writing or through clear statements to relatives and friends."); cf John G. Strand,
Note, The "Living Will". The Right to Death with Dignity, 26 CAsM W. RES. L. REV.
485, 516 (1976) ("[A]ny problems posed by a possible failure to appreciate fully the
significance of a Living Will at the time of execution are minimized by the opportunity
to revokeJ.
6 See ALA. CODE § 22-8A-5(a)(3) (1975) (providing that a verbal declaration of
intent to revoke will suffice if a witness, 19 years of age or older, signs and dates a
writing confirming that such an expression of intent was made).
1 John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921, 926 (Fla. 1984)
("If such a person, while competent, had executed a so-called 'living' or 'mercy'will, that
will would be persuasive evidence of that incompetent person's intention and it should be
given great weight by the person or persons who substitute their judgment on behalf of
the teminally ill incompetent.").
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Individuals need not make use of a living will to insure that their
wishes regarding medical care will be taken into account should they
become incompetent. They might instead designate someone to be a
proxy decisionmaker should the need arise.' That way, the individual
would not be forced to try to anticipate in detail the particular circumnstances under which she would want treatment.' Instead, the proxy
decisionmaker would be allowed to apply her understanding of the
patient's wishes to the particular circumstances at the time they arise and
make a decision accordingly.' As a further benefit, the patient would
then have someone advocating that her wishes be respected rather than
a mute piece of paper which a physician might choose to ignore.'
Finally, living wills only apply in a fairly narrow set of circumstances;
the set of circumstances in which the proxy decisionmaker may make
medical decisions is much less narrowly restricted.'
IL

STANDARDS FOR MAKING TREATMENT DECIsIONs

The two most frequently used tests for medical decisionmaking for
incompetents are substituted judgment and best interests. The tests
involve different criteria and are designed to achieve different ends.
Regrettably, they are becoming more and more difficult to distinguish,

" In re Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 15 (Fla. 1990) (explaining that a patient can make
treatment wishes known through a living will, oral declaration, or proxy decisionmker);
see also MEYES, supra note 14, § 11:6, at 213-20 (Cum. Supp. Dec. 1991).
' Martyn & Jacobs, supra note 17, at 786 (noting that it is often impossible for a
person executing a living will "to anticipate the precise medical and practical circumstances that influence his dying process"); Holly C. Gieszl & Peggy A. Velasco,
Comment; The Cruzan Legacy: Legislative and JudicialResponses and Insights for the
Future, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 719, 736 (1992) (noting that directive may be too finite to
include the "many possible combinations and permutations" that might occur).
' American Bar Ass'n, The Incompetent Patient's Right to Refse or Terminate
reatment, REFuSAL OR TERMiATION OF MEDICAL TREATmENT WHO DECIDES? 28-30
(1990) (describing the many advantages of using a durable power of attorney rather than

a living will).
6 See DANIEL CALLAHAN, SEFriNG LaM MEDICAL GoALs IN AN AGING SOCIERY
175 (1987) ("A continuing problem with 'living wills' has been the unwillingness ofmany
physicians to honor them ... '1.
I See Terrance A. Kline, Suicide, Libely and Our Imperfect Constitution An
Analysis of the Legitimacy of the Supreme Cowt's Entanglement in Decisions to
Terminate Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment, 14 CAMPBELL L. REV. 69, 98 (1991) ("A
majority of the living will statutes do not permit the withdrawal of food and water, and
all such statutes require the existence of a terminal medical condition prior to their
effectiveness.").

1994-95]

RIGHT TO DiE

which may lead not only to theoretical confusion but also to regrettable
and inappropriate outcomes.

A. Substituted Judgment
The situation in which one individual designates someone else to be
a proxy decisionmaker is a paradigmatic case of substituted judgment.
Yet, the notion of substituted judgment should not be misunderstood. The
proxy does not try to substitute her own judgment for the patient's ' but
instead substitutes the beliefs, values, and desires of the patient for her
own and then makes a treatment decision.
Substituted judgment is not limited to situations in which someone
has been chosen by the patient to make a decision in light of the patient's
previously expressed beliefs, desires, and values. Rather, it is used in a
variety of contexts. Basically, "[t]he 'substituted judgment' rule of
decision making for an incompetent patient [is used] to replicate what the
patient himself would decide, if competent to do so, under the circumstances at hand."
To understand the numerous contexts in which substituted judgment
may be employed, it is helpful to understand the rationale behind its use.
The Supreme Court of Massachusetts suggested that it is appropriate "to
shift the emphasis away from a paternalistic view of what is 'best' for a
patient toward a reaffirmation that the basic question is what decision will
comport with the will of the person involved, whether that person be
'
(
competent or incompetent."
It is easiest to ascertain which treatment would comport with the will
of the patient when the patient has clearly and explicitly articulated what
she would want done in precisely the situation which currently exists.
67Mack v. Mack, 618 A.2d 744, 762 (Md. 1993) (McAuliffe, J., dissenting)
("'Substituted judgment' is not a particularly apt term - the very result we wish to avoid
is the substitution of someone else's judgment for that of the ward. Rather, the aim is to
determine, by reference to all that may be known about the ward, what decision he or she
would make ifpresently competent and possessed of complete information concerning all
relevant factors.").
' MEYERS, supra note 14, § 11:6, at 215 (Cum. Supp. Dec. 1993); see also In re
A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (en banc) ("[TIhe substituted judgment
inquiry is primarily a subjective one: as nearly as possible, the court must ascertain what
the patient would do if competent"); NoRMAN L. CANTOR, LEGAL FRoNTiERs OF DEATH
AND DYING 63 (1987) ("Under the substituted judgment approach, the surrogate decisionmaker must effectuate, to the extent possible, the course of conduct which the patient
would have desired.").
' Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., 497 N.E.2d 626, 633 (Mass. 1986).
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However, patients often are not sufficiently specific or explicit Sometimes their statements are only slightly lacking in the relevant degree of

specificity or clarity, while at other times the patient might have made no
relevant statement at all. Situations in which there had been no statement
at all might include scenarios in which the person had once been
competent but had nonetheless not expressed any preferences as well as
scenarios in which the individual had never been competent and thus
could never have had preferences formed as a result of the requisite
deliberation.
Thus, substituted judgment might potentially be used in four different
scenarios:
(1) the individual, while competent, had previously made precise
statements about what she would want done in exactly the situation
presented;
(2) the individual, while competent, had made general statements
about what she would want but those statements were not precise enough
to indicate the particular course of action appropriate in the existing
circumstances;
(3) the individual, while competent, had never addressed the issue;
and
(4) the individual, having always been incompetent, could thus never
have articulated an explicit considered judgment.
1. Individual Made a PreciseDirective While Competent
In a situation in which the person had clearly described what she
would want done in precisely the existing circumstances, her wishes will
normally be carried out.70 Some courts suggest that this situation
presents the paradigmatic case of substituted judgment.7 Others disagree, suggesting not only that the case is not paradigmatic, but that the
case does not even involve substituted judgment. Rather, such courts
think that such a case should be viewed in the same light as one in which
the patient herself makes a current expression of intent.' Substituted
" MEYERS, supra note 14, § 11:4, at 270 (noting that an incompetent's unequivocal
wishes not to be treated will generally be upheld).
"See In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985) (holding that competent adult
generally has the right to refuse medical treatment).
"In re Swan, 569 A.2d 1202, 1206 (Me. 1990) (explaining that the decision was
based on the patient's own conclusion and not on a theory of substituted judgment); Gieszl
& Velasco, supra note 63, at 729-30 ("Arguably, when a patient has a written directive,
particularly a detailed one such as a medical directive, there is no 'substituted judgment'
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judgment might be reserved by such courts for cases in which the patient had
not stated her intent or desire with sufficient clarity or specificity.7 3
Basically, the disagreement with respect to what is the paradigmatic case
of substituted judgment might be understood in terms of how much the term
'judgment" is emphasized. Insofar asjudgmentinvolves a third party' having
to weigh various considerations and then arrive at some conclusion about
what the patient would have said, substituted judgment seems inappropriate
in a case in which the patient had explicitly and specifically manifested what
should be done in precisely the existing situation. In those circumstances, the
patient had already made quite clear what she would like done, and a
mechanical application of the persont wishes would suffice. Insofar as the
substitutedaspect is emphasized and insofar as one pictures the third party as
the individual who is supposed to represent the judgment of the patient
because the patient cannot act on her own beha4 it is quite appropriate to
talk about substituted judgment in a case in which the patient had quite
clearly manifested her wishes.
2. Individual Made GeneralComments While Competent
Where the person was once competent, she might have made comments
which, even ifnot dispositive, would at least be indicative of what the person
would have wanted. Courts and commentators disagree about how much
weight to give to statements which are not sufficiently "clear and convincing"
to satisfy the relevant test.7 For example, one might take into account the
patients personality, values, and what she had said about various medical
issues, and then "extrapolate' what she would have chosen.75 Alternatively,
one might argue that unless the patient had been very specific about what
course of action she would want and very specific about the circumstances
under which she would want that course taken, the patient should not be
Rather, the surrogate decisionmaker serves as an agent, or an attorney-in-fact, to assure
that the patient's previously expressed wishes are followed.").
I In re Gardner, 534 A.2d 947, 950 (Me. 1987) (finding no need for substituted
judgment when the patient had made his "pertinent wishes well known'').
See In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 443 (NJ. 1987).
7S Id. at 444 ("The surrogate considers the patient's prior statements about and
reactions to medical issues, and all the facets of the patient's personality that the surrogate
is familiar with - with, of course, particular reference to his or her relevant philosophical,
theological, and ethical values - in order to extrapolate what course of medical treatment
the patient would choose.") (footnote omitted); see also In re Westchester County Medical
Cir. ex reL O'Connor, 531 N.E.2d 607, 619 (N.Y. 1988) (Simons, 1, dissenting) ("[The
surrogate's decision should take into account the patient's personal values and religious

beliefs, prior statements onthe subject, attitudes about the impact his or her condition Will
have on others, and any other factors bearing on the issue.").
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considered to have expressed any relevant desires at all. One would simply
ignore the nonspecific comments and opt for a best interests analysis 6
Advantages exist in requiring great clarity and specificity in the patient'
comments before assuming they represent the patients desires accurately and
fully. One might worry that an individual who had made vague, general
comments about medical treatment would not have considered the relevant

subject matter with sufficient gravity; while someone who had precisely
specified the conditions under which she would want treatment would seem
more likely to have considered the relevant issues carefully.

An additional worry is that the individual might have made the comments
a long time ago.78 The person might subsequently have had the opportmity
to examine the issue in greater depth and might not have reached the same
conclusion. Indeed, a person who had made vague, general comments a long
time ago might not even realize that those comments would be considered
evidence of her considered judgment.!One must also worry that courts might use the clarity and specificity
requirements to thwart the wishes of individuals. Indeed, because most people
do not clearly express their desires, strictly enforcing a requirement of clarity
and specificity would mean that most people could not have treatment
withheld using the substituted judgment test.80 Further, such a policy would
not protect minors'
' See infra notes 186-236 and accompanying text. See also Michele Yuen,
Comment, Letting Daddy Die: Adopting New Standards for Surrogate Decisionmaking,
39 UCLA L. REV. 581, 619-20 (1992) (suggesting that best interests be the test where the
patient's wishes are not clear).
7' Jobes, 529 A.2d at 443 ("All of the statements about life-support that were attributed to
Mrs. Jobes were remote, general, spontaneous, and made in casual circumstances. Indeed, they
closely track the examples of evidence that we have explicitly characterized as unreliable:);
Westchester County Medical Cr., 531 N.2d at 613 ("There exists the danger that the
statements were made without the reflection and resolve that would be brought to bear on the
issue if the patient were presently capable of making the decision?').
Cf.In re Hughes, 611 A.2d 1148, 1152 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992) ("The
probative value of the evidence must also be considered, and may vary depending on
remoteness, consistency and thoughtfulness of prior actions and statements.).
7 Cy. Westchester County Medical Ctr., 531 N.E.2d at 614 ("[A] person whose
expressions of intention were limited to oral statements may not as fully appreciate the
need to 'rescind' those statements after a change of heart.") (footnote omitted).
" Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 323 (1990) (Brennan, .,
dissenting) ("Too few people execute living wills or equivalently formal directives for
such an evidentiary rule to ensure adequately that the wishes of incompetent persons will
be honored.") (footnote omitted); In re L.W., 482 N.W.2d 60, 67-68 (Wis. 1992)
("Relatively few individuals provide explicit written or oral instructions concerning their
treatment preferences should they become incompetent.") (footnote omitted).
s' Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 339 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (finding that such a policy would
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Consider In re Westchester County Med'cal Center, a case which
involved a patient, Mary O'Connor, who had expressly stated that she wished
not to be kept alive on artificial support. ' She had comforted relatives
during their prolonged final illnesses and knew that she did not want to
undergo a similar fate.' However, she had not specified that she would
want to refuse treatment even if that would mean that her death would be
painful." Because it was unclear whether someone in her condition would
in fact experience pain were she to die of thirst and starvation and because
she had not specified that she would want nutrition and hydration withdrawn
even it in fact, that withdrawal would be painful, the court held that her
wishes were not clear enough to be dispositive."6 In this case, the court
seemed to ignore the wishes of the patient because it did not agree with the
result which would otherwise occur.' Unless suitable precautions are
mandated, courts can use the specificity requirement to thwart the wishes of
88
patients.
Even where courts have not imposed an artificially high specificity
requirement, the patientt previous comments may not have been sufficiently
specific. When the expressed desires of the individual are not clear enough
to be dispositive, different ways exist for taking the desires into account. One
might adopt a kind of hybrid test in which evidence about intent (even if not

afford "no protection to children, to young people who are victims of unexpected

accidents
or illnesses').
2

' Westchester County Medical Ctr., 531 N.E.2d at 609; see also Sevems v.

Wilmington Medical Ctr., 421 A.2d 1334, 1338 n.2 (Del. 1980) (involving a patient who
had been an active member of the Euthanasia Council of Delaware and who had said that
she did not want to be kept alive as a "vegetable" or by extraordinary means).
"Westchester County Medical ar., 531 N.E.2d at 609.
Id. at 890; see also DeGrella ex rel. Parrent v. Elston, 858 S.W.2d 698, 713 (Ky.
1993) (Wintersheimer, L,dissenting) (involving a patient who had never specifically
considered the question of the withdrawal of nutrition and hydration).
's Westchester County Medical Or., 531 N.E.2d at 610 (noting that the doctor could
not be "medically certain" that the patient would not suffer). But see In re Doe, 583
N.E.2d 1263, 1269 (Mass. 1992) (noting that medical evidence indicates that a person in
a persistent vegetative state will not suffer physical or psychological discomfort from the
withdrawal of treatment).
"Westchester County Medical Cir., 531 N.E.2d at 613.
See id.at 626 (Simons, J., dissenting) ("Mhemajority, disguising its action as an
application of the rule on self-detennination, has made its own substituted judgment by
improperly finding facts and drawing infemaces coanty to the facts found by the courts
below.").
" Id. at 619 (Simons, J., dissenting) (The majority "has for all practical purposes
foreclosed any realistic possibility that a patient, once rendered incompetent, will have his
or her wishes to forego life-sustaining treatment enforced").
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rising to the appropriate standard to be determinative) would be considered.O Casual comments made about other people situations might meet
this standard, even if they would not meet the clear and convincing
standard. ° Precisely because the expression of intent would not meet the

relevant standard of reliability, however, one might require additional
safeguards to assure that the decision would be appropriate; for example, an
objective benefits-burdens test could be employed to make sure that the
burdens of continued life would outweigh the benefits?'
Perhaps it would seem that use of a hybrid test would be inappropriate
because it involves mixing two very different things - the individualA own
desires or preferences or intentions on the one hand and the individual's
"objective!' best interests on the other. Yet, there is reason to believe that
courts do and perhaps should conflate these.r If the patient had made
general comments suggesting that she would not want treatment if in great
pain with no hope for recovery, it would be cruel and inhumane not to
discontinue treatment, 93 even if she did not in fadtsay that she wanted
treatment discontinued in precisely these circumstances.94
Some courts use a system involving different thresholds:
(1) Ifthe person had clearly and explicitly specified earlier that she would
not want treatment in the existing circumstances, then her wishes will
normally be granted?5 Here, a fairly exacting standard must be met (or
' In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1232 (N.L 1985) (providing a test in which desires
' not unequivocally expressed" are taken into account).
"oId. at 1232 ("[f]nformally expressed reactions to other people's medical conditions
and treatment - might be sufficient"). But see Bopp & Avila, supra note 39, at 214
("[Tihe states should not presume that expressions of sympathy for the plight of others,
remarks of distaste for nursing homes, or general exclamations that 'Idon'twant to be like
that' (meaning severely or otherwise disabled) are serious, informed and specific waivers
of the right to receive health care needed to sustain life.").
91See Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1232.
' MEYEps, supra note 14, § 11:6, at 214 (Cum. Supp. Dec. 1993) ('"Objective'
factors are inevitably involved in substituted judgment cases. What is best for the patient
becomes what others, reasonably, think best").
'3 Glanville Williams, "Mercy-Killing" Legislation -A Rejoinder, 43 WAsH. L. REV.
1, 1 (1958) ("[]t is cruel to allow a human being to linger for months in the last stages
of agony, wealness and decay, and to refuse him his demand for merciful release.").
" In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 456 (N.J. 1987) (Handler, J., concurring) ("[W]hen the
patient is suffering under conditions that are so extreme that discontinuation of treatment
seems to be in her 'best interests,' the courts are less troubled by the doubt that this
treatment decision does not truly express the patient's right to self-determination:').
"5 MEYERS, supra note 14, § 11:4, at 268 ("If the patient's determined desire would
have been to refuse consent to further care, then the court will normally follow that wish
... "); see also Yuen, supra note 76, at 629 ("If a patient's Uatment preferences can be
shown by clear evidence, they should be followed regardless of any best interests
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threshold reached) before the wishes will be thought sufficiently explicit
and specific to be honored.
(2) If the above threshold is not reached, then another test is used. If
the person had made a fairly clear statement about her wishes, it might
be considered sufficiently reliable to be relevant to the eventual decision,
even ff not specific or clear enough to be dispositive.
(3) If the person had not made comments sufficiently clear or specific
to meet the requirements of standard (2), then the comments will be
ignored entirely.96
Other courts do not use a system which deems a statement irrelevant
if it fails to meet the appropriate standard.' They instead have a system
which involves a continuum, in which the greater the degree of uncertainty regarding the person's preferences, the greater the showing that is
required to establish that the patient's best interests would be served by
nontreatment." However, whether using the threshold or the continuum
analysis, courts are seeking to effectuate the patient's intent. It is only
when the patient's intent cannot be established with the requisite degree
of certainty that the best interests analysis will be employed
Courts need not adopt an approach in which the paramount concern
is the effectuation of the patient's intent. In Drabickv. Drabick,the court
suggested that California gives the conservator a great deal of leeway." Not only did the court reject a requirement that a particular
threshold be met in order for the patient's preferences to be considered,"0 ' but the court implied that the patient's specific, expressed
preferences were merely relevant rather than dispositive.'"
detennination").
- In re Conoy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1232 (N.L 1985) (requiring some "trustworthy
evidence" to qualify consideration of the patient's wishes).
"Cf In re Peter, 529 A.2d 419, 425 (N.L 1987) ("The interested parties need not

have clear and convincing evidence of the patient's intentions; they need only 'render their
best judgment' as to what medical decision the patient would want them to make.")

(citation omitted).
" Jobes, 529 A.2d at 458 (Handler, J., concurring) ("In some settings these
approaches - self-deternmination and best interests - are not necessarily neatly divided but
may represent a continuum of values.").
See infra notes 186-236 and accompanying text.
"' Drabick v. Drabick, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840, 857 (Ct. App. 1988) ('IThe conservator

... must make the final treatment decision regardless of how much or how little
information about the conservatee's preferences is available.").
101Id.
" Id. ("Acknowledging that the patient's expressed preferences are relevant, it is

enough for the conservator, who must act in the conservatee's best interests, to consider
them in good faith ).
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The Drabick court justified its devaluation of the importance of the
patient previously expressed preferences by suggesting that an incompetent's
right to choose is a legal fiction at best."' The court reasoned that the
patient inability to choose did not entail that he had '"no protected,
fundamental interest in the medical treatment decisions that affect hi.'
However, because the incompetent could not choose for himself; the court
decided the only way within its power "to continue to respect him as an
individual"'' 5 was to have a conservator.
Courts might recognize the need for a conservator but also consider
expressed, specific comments dispositive. One of the most ironic aspects of
the Drabick opinion involved its recognition that whether "the benefits of
treatment outweigh its detriments is a decision that engages personal and
medical values, including ideas about the quality of life."' The court
argued that such a calculation is not one which "courts are constituted or
especially well-qualified to make," ' 7 apparently believing that the conservator was in a better position to make such a decision engaging personal and
medical values than the actualpatient, even if the patient had left clear and
explicit instructions. 08
The guardian task is by no means an easy one. The Supreme Judicial
Court ofMassachusetts suggested that the guardian should make the treatment
decision "which would be made by the incompetent person, if that person
were competent, but taking into account the present and future incompetency
of the individual as one ofthe factors which would necessarily enter into the
decision-making process of the competent person:"'
On first reading, the court seemed to offer conditions which are
impossible to fulfill. The guardian is to make the decision which the person
would make were she competent while at the same time taking into account
the patient's present and future incompetency. The court seemed to ask the
guardian to adopt the mantle of a person who is simultaneously competent
and incompetent."0

'03

Id. at 854 (footnote omitted).

104

Id.

'' Id. at 855.
'0 6 Id. at 846.

Id.
" But see CANTOIR, supra note 68, at 85 ("The one instance in which a guardian's

107

decision to preserve an incompetent patient ought to be overridable - though again there
is as yet no precedent available - is where the patient's previously expressed wishes are
clearly being contravened.").
"9 Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Salkewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 431
(Mass. 1977).
"o C)' Robertson, supra note 35, at 207 ("Substituted judgment endorses a second
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The court was not trying to give the guardian an impossible task;
rather, it was trying to make sure that certain factors which might
otherwise be overlooked were considered. Suppose that an individual might be able to tolerate a treatment much more easily if she knew
what the treatment involved, why it was being given, and how long it
would last."' The treatment would then seem not like the capricious
infliction of torture but instead like a painful regimen which was
tolerable given the long-term benefits. Someone who could not understand these aspects of the treatment would have much more difficulty
enduring the same side effects. When courts ask guardians to consider
present and future incompetency, they want guardians to remember,
among other things, that treatments may be harder to endure when it
cannot be understood why something is being done or how long it will

last.
What is becoming increasingly clear is that courts are not consistent
with respect to the duties that they expect guardians to fulfill Some
expect the guardian to make a substituted judgmeni, others want the
guardian to determine the best interests of the patient, and still others
want the guardian to use her best judgment about what should be
done."u Not only is this situation potentially confusing for conservators,
but it makes it more difficult for patients to have their wishes respected
even if they know precisely the circumstances in which they would or
would not want treatment. Further, an additional issue raised by the lack
of consensus among the states as to the appropriate standards for
conservators is whether individuals who wish to have their own or their
loved ones' treatment decisions evaluated in light of different standards
will forum-shop. Courts might then be in the position of deciding whether
it would be in the best interests of the incompetent patient to have the
standards of a sister state used to determine the patient's treatment
3
plan."

oxymoron - the idea of the competent incompetent person.").
.) Q. In re Spring, 399 N.E.2d 493, 499 (Mass. App. Ct. 1979) (distinguishing the
situation before the court from a previous one because the "ward could then understand
the necessity for the treatments and the accompanying discomfort and cooperate in their

administration"').
2 In re Colyer, 660 P.2d 738, 747 (Wash. 1983) ("[The guardian's duty is to use his
best judgment in deciding whether or not to assert the personal right of the incompetent

to refuse life sustaining treatment.' (emphasis omitted).
See In re Busalacchi, No. 59582, 1991 WL 26851 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991) (deciding
whether a guardian should be allowed to tansfer a ward from Missouri to Minnesota).
See generally Lea Brilmayer, Interstate Preempzon" The Right to Travel, the Right to
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3. Individual Expressed Nothing Relevant While Competent
Sometimes, a formerly competent individual had made no directly
relevant comments at all with respect to whether she would want medical
treatment in particular circumstances. At least two issues are raised in
such situations: (1) is it possible to figure out with a reasonable degree
of reliability what the person would have said, and (2) if so, should one
consider that reasonably reliable hypothesis about what the person would

have said?
Even if no directly relevant comments had been made, n 4 a guardian
might be able to infer with a reasonable degree of certainty what the
individual would have wanted." 5 Basically, the guardian must try to put
herself in the patient's position and, based on her intimate knowledge of
the patient, make the best judgment she can about what the patient would
have chosen."' Courts can employ numerous criteria."7 This judgLife, and the Right to Die, 91 MICH. L. REv. 873 (1993).
114 Foody v. Manchester Memorial Hosp., 482 A.2d 713, 721 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1984)
("An expression of intent while competent is not essential ....
").
. Mack v. Mack, 618 A.2d 744, 762 (Md. 1993) (McAuliffe, J., dissenting) ("The
substituted judgment approach comes into play when the ward has made no prior
statements bearing on the issue, or the statements attributed to the ward do not produce
a clear and convincing answer."). But see MEYERS, supra note 14, § 11:6, at 215 (Cum.
Supp. Dec. 1993) ("The substituted judgment rule can only be relied upon where the
patient has at one time been competent and, while competent, has expressed his or her
preferences or views on the subject, or in a way relevant to the treatment decision at

hand: .
G In re Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292, 305 (Ill. 1989) (Ward, J., dissenting) ("TI]he
majority must presume that a surrogate decisionmaker will acquire such intimate
knowledge of the patient's basic views or philosophy that the surrogate can formulate a
reliable opinion regarding how the incompetent would have reacted to his current
predicament even if the incompetent had never previously expressed views upon the
subject").
"- Mack, 618 A.2d at 771 (Chasanow, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)
(discussing different types of evidence which would support withdrawal of life support);
In re Hughes, 611 A.2d 1148, 1152 (N.J. 1992) ("This intent might be embodied in a
living will; oral directives to family, friends and health care providers, a durable power
of attorney; religious beliefs or tenets of areligion; or from the patient's consistent pattern
of conduct with respect to prior medical decisions.") (citations omitted); Kenney, supra
note 18, at 813 ("Trustworthy evidence that the incompetent patient would have wanted
the treatment terminated can be presented in various forms, such as the patient's
competently expressed reactions to other people's medical conditions and teatment, or the
patient's personal philosophies or religious beliefs."); Yuen, supra note 76, at 583 ("This
decisioninaking standard considers individual factors such as statements made by the
patient while competent regarding medical decisions as well as religious, moral, and
philosophical convictions.").
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ment may be based on what the patient has said in the past 1 8 or on
what relatives and others currently say about the patient. 9 Or the
guardian might instead look at the patient's valuesm.
Thus, if the
patient had not said anything about her wishes should she require

aggressive treatment for a particular condition but had stated that she
believes life to be sacred, one might infer that she would want aggressive
treatment performed.'

When a court uses the patient's desires and values to make a
determination, it does not simply use a reasonable person standard,'
but instead tries to reflect what the patient herself would have said if
confronted with the existing situation.' The Supreme Court of New

..In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1250 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (en banc) (Tlhe greatest
weight should be given to the previously expressed wishes of the patient This includes
prior statements, either written or oral, even though the treatment alternatives
at hand may
not have been addressed."); see also Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., 497 N.E.2d
626, 631 (Mass. 1986) C[Tihe judge considered various factors including the following;
(1) Brophy's expressed preferences; (2) his religious convictions and their relation to
refusal of treatment; (3) the impact on his family; (4) the probability of adverse side
effects; and (5) the prognosis, both with and without treatment.").
9 Longeway, 549 N.E.2d at 305-06 (Ward, J., dissenting) ("A surrogate and the court
must piece together any available testimony from relatives and other sources to construc
a persona.").
'2 0 A.C., 573 A.2d at 1250 (suggesting that courts in substituted judgment cases

"should pay special attention to the known values and goals of the incapacitated patient,
and should strive, ifpossible, to extrapolate from those values and goals what the patient's
decision would be").
1
n Longeway, 549 N.E.2d at 299 ("Where no clear intent exists, the patient's personal
value system must guide the surrogate .... ).
' MEYERS, supra note 14, § 11:6, at 216 (Cum. Supp. Dec. 1993) ("Under the
doctrine, the question is not what a reasonable or what an average person would want
done under the circmstances, but rather what the particular patient would have decided
if able to choose for himself.).
m Mark v. Mack, 618 A.2d 744, 757 (Md. 1993) ("IThe inquiry focuses on whether
the ward had determined, or would determine, that treatment should be withdrawn under
the circumstances of the case."); MEYERS, supra note 14, § 11:2, at 266 ("The decision
of a patient to refuse medical treatment, in order to be rational, must be based on reason
and understanding. However, it need not be wise or sensible in the mind of the physician,
the court, or anyone else.") (footnote omitted); JAMES RACEs, THE END OF LIFE 119
(1986) ("We should not, without very strong reasons, compel people to do what they
think is wrong, even if their beliefs are mistaken."); Bym, supra note 21, at 29 ("The law
of informed consent would be rendered meaningless if patient choice were subservient to
conscientious medical judgment") (footnote omitted); Richard Delgado, Euthanasia
Reconsidered - The Choice of Death as an Aspect of the Right ofPrivacy, 17 ARi7. L.
REv. 474, 484 (1975) ("If a competent and informed decision has been made, traditional
legal notions of autonomy and self-deterniation favor the protection ofindividual choice,
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Jersey made clear that the "question is not what a reasonable or average
person would have chosen to do under the circumstances but what the
particular patient would have done if able to choose for himself."' The
court held that "life-sustaining treatment may be withheld or withdrawn
from an incompetent patient when it is clear that the particular patient
M
would have refused the treatment under the circumstances involved."'
As the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts explained. "Individual
choice is determined not by the vote of the majority but by the complexities of the singular situation viewed from the unique perspective of the
person called on to make the decision."" Thus, the guardian may
consider a variety of factors when attempting to determine what the
patient herself would have decided. What the guardian should not do,
however, is try to place herself in the patient's shoes and then use her
own (ie., the guardian's) subjective standards and values to make the
relevant decision. 7
Even if one makes clear that the guardian is not to use her own
values, the risk is always present that the guardian will nonetheless do
However, it would be false to
that, consciously or unconsciously.'

even if that choice seems to others foolish or tragic."); Liacos, .upra note 21, at 219
('With regard to medical treatment, then, the autonomy principle would forbid doctors,
family members, or the state from ordering a patient to do what they consider to be in his
own best interest. The individual should not be deprived of the basic freedom to make
fundamental decisions central to his life.").
' In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1229 (N.J. 1985); see also In re L.W., 482 N.W.2d
60, 73 (Wis. 1992) ("Il]he guardian must assess these factors from the standpoint of the
patient, and should not substitute his or her own view of the 'quality of life' of the

ward").
See Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1229.
Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Salkewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 428
(Mass. 1977).
C . In re Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292, 306 (11. 1989) (Ward, J., dissenting) ("The
... determination is obviously fraught with the danger that the surrogate's decision will
reflect the surrogate's value system (or a mistaken view of the incompetent's value
system) and be opposed to the patient's personal value system").
' In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1250-51 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (en bane) (noting that
"sometimes family members will rely on their own judgments or predilections rather than
serving as conduits for expressing the patient's wishes"); Longeway, 549 N.E.2d at 306
(Ward, J., dissenting) ("Allowing a guardian to substitute his judgment for that of an
incompetent ward creates a grave risk that... there will be wards who will undergo the
death described in frightening terms inthe majority opinion, without ever having had such
an intent to do so."); see also DeGrella ex rel. Parrent v. Elston, 858 S.W.2d 698, 711
(Ky. 1993) (Lambert, J., concurring) (noting that "the perceived moral and ethical values
of the patient may be lost or significantly influenced by the values of the surrogate");
Rhoden, supra note 32, at 377 (stating that "the proxy's assessment of what the patient
'
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assume that the only danger posed by this inappropriate substitution of
preferences is that guardians will terminate treatment too early. Abuses
might also occur if treatment is continued when the patient would have
wanted it stopped. L9 The damage to the individual from prolonged
treatment might involve not only a denial of autonomy but also great,
unnecessary pain and a permanent alteration in the memories of loved
ones. Rather than remembering their grandmother as a strong, vibrant
character, grandchildren might have a last picture of a woman in great
pain connected to an imposing machine.'" The possible costs of a
premature death obviously might also be greatly burdensome and do not
need elaboration here."' Thus, the importance of the role of the guardian should by no means be undervalued.'
When one discusses the injury which may occur from a denial of
autonomy, one may have in mind the injury which occurs when
someone's explicit statement is ignored or, instead, when the course of
treatment is not what the patient would have wanted even if in fact the
patient had never manifested her desires. When an individual has not
manifested her preferences, the possibility always exists that the guardian
will make an incorrect judgment about what she in fact would have
wanted. Even putting aside the worry that the guardian will inaccurately
reflect the patient's preferences, some commentators suggest that one
should not even consider what the incompetent person would have

would want, no matter how scrupulously perfomed, relies to some extent upon the
proxy's values in addition to the patient's"); Debra L. Dippel, Comment, Someone to
Watch Over Me: MedicalDecision-Mal'ngfor Hopelessly 1l Incompetent Adult Patients,
24 AKRON L. REV. 639, 667 (1991) ("Unless a patient has executed an advance directive

while competent, or there is irrefutable evidence of the patient's beliefs and wishes, the
surrogate must act upon his own intuition."); Ronzetti, suqra note 58, at 155 ("Substituted
judgment risks displacing the patient's desires with those of the surrogate decisionmaker,

because no surrogate can make such a decision without somehow incorporating her own
values.").
119In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 453 (N.J. 1987) (Handler, J., concurring) (holding that
"'abuse' includes not only discontinuing treatment for a patient who would have wanted
treatment continued, but also the continuation of treatment for a patient who would have

wanted teatment stopped").
-0 See CANqTOR, supra note 68, at 65 ("Whether their concern is to avoid suffering,
or to avoid crippling expenses to their estate, or simply not to be remembered in a
deteriorated condition, people can appreciate the assurance that their wishes will be
honored.").
m'See id. at 87-91.
' In re Jeffers, 606 N.E.2d 727, 730 (111. App. Ct. 1992) ("Great care should be and
is taken... to ensure that the guardian exercises the incompetent person's wishes because

of the final, irreversible nature of that decision.").

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol 83

said.13 Such a view holds that if the person did not in fact express her
preferences, then her interest in having her previous manifestations of
autonomy respected would not be violated if the unexpressed preferences
were not considered in the relevant determination."M
If one adopts the approach in which autonomy is only violated if
explicit instructions are ignored, then patients who have expressed a
preference which is only slightly less clear or specific than the standard
requires will be treated as if they had expressed no preferences at all, at
least insofar as their autonomy interests are concerned." Especially if
the standards for what counts as sufficiently explicit are relatively
difficult to meet, large numbers of individuals might then be precluded
from having their preferences even considered, much less from having
them be dispositive.1 While autonomy interests would not be violated
by a refusal to consider insufficiently precise directions dispositive, those
interests would be violated by a refusal to consider the comments at all,
if the comments were sufficiently clear to indicate what the general
wishes would have been.137
A theory which holds that autonomy interests are not violated by the
refusal to give any weight at all to slightly imprecise directions would
inappropriately privilege form over substance. It would be as if the
individual were being punished for her failure to meet the requisite
standards of precision. The goal of substituted judgment is not to grant
a privilege to individuals with good crafting or speaking skills; rather, it
is to effectuate even the not-clearly-expressed wishes of patients."
Where it is unclear what the patient would have wanted not merely
because of slight imprecision but because the patient has not said enough
133 See CANToR, supra note 68, at 62; Robertson, supra note 25, at 1190 n182; see
also MEYERS, supra note 14, § 11:10, at 289-91.
L Robertson, supra note 25, at 1168 ("If the competent person has not made such
a choice, there is no interest in any particular exercise of autonomy. Being treated as one
might have chosen, when one has not made a choice, cannot be required out of respect
for the competent person's autonomy.').
"sSee Crmm v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 274-75 (1990) (citing
In re Westchester County Medical Ctr. ex rel. O'Connor, 531 N.E.2d 607, 613-15 (N.Y.
1988)).
m Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 323 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Too few people execute living
wills or equivalently fonnal directives for such an evidentiary rule to ensure adequately
that the wishes of incompetent persons will be honored."); In re L.W., 482 N.W.2d 60,
67-68 (Wis. 1992) ("Relatively few individuals provide explicit written or oral instructions
concerning their treatment preferences should they become incompetent").
3 Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 273.
"' In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1229 (N.J. 1985); CANTOR, supra note 68, at 63.
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to reliably indicate what her wishes would have been, no violation of
autonomy occurs by refusing to use a substituted judgment test." In
fact, some commentators argue that no violation of autonomy occurs by
the failure to use substituted judgment for two classes of individuals:
those previously competent individuals who have never expressed a
preference and always-incompetent individuals." Perhaps paradoxically, while these commentators may be correct about the previously
competent patient, they are incorrect about the always-incompetent

patient.
4. Indvidual Always Incompetent
This category includes individuals whose mental age precludes their
being competent regardless of their chronological age and individuals
whose chronological age precludes their being competent regardless of
their mental age.14 ' Substituted judgment decisionmaking for individuals
in this category can be very difficult to justify, 42 unless one makes
some important distinctions.
When analyzing the appropriate paradigm for always-incompetent

patients, it is important to consider who is included in that category. Both
the adult with the mental age of an eighteen-month-old'43 and the
teenager who has not yet reached the age of majority'" are within the
supra note 14, § 12:29, at 376.

_

See

'

Id. at 372 (noting that "where the patient has not clearly expressed his or her

MEYERS,

desires before the onset of unconsciousness, a 'best interests' analysis is normally
considered appropriate by the courts"); Dresser, supra note 33, at 378 (noting that the best
interest test is preferable to the substituted judgment standard where there is no evidence
of the preferences of the formerly competent patient); Splaine, supra note 56, at 931, 933
(arguing for the best interest test rather than the substituted judgment standard in
circunstances where the preference of the formerly competent patient cannot be

detenmined.
'4' Q. In re CA, 603 N.E.2d 1171, 1180 (L. App. Ct. 1992) ("The substituted
judgment test, however, is of limited relevance in the case of immature minors. If
anyone's judgment is being substituted it is that of the parents or some other person with
a close interest in the child's welfare."); see also MEYERS, supra note 14, § 6:8, at 104
("The test for whether or not an incompetent can consent to medical Uatment is really
the same as to whether or not a child may consent to medical treatment, minority simply

being one form of inability to consent.").
142 MEYERS, spra note 14, § 11:6, at 216 ("Application of the 'substituted judgment'
rule necessarily presumes that the patient was at one time competent and did, while
competent, express himself or herself on the subject of when he would want lifesustaining treatment withdrawn or withheld.").
1 See, e.g., In re Storer, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 270 (1981).
'"See, e.g., In re Swan, 569 A.2d 1202, 1202, 1204 (Me. 1990).
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same group, although it is not at all clear that the same standard should
be applied to both. Courts must be very careful when they make use of
the substituted judgment procedures for individuals who have always
been incompetent. Two different issues might arise with respect to their
treatment: (1) was the correct result reached, and (2) was the process by
which that result was reached a credible one? 45 Even if one reaches the
"correct' result the process may nonetheless appear tainted if obviously
specious rationales are used.1"
For example, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed
a lower court's use of substituted judgment in a case involving a fiveyear-old who had been in a persistent vegetative state since before
reaching the age of one.147 While the lower court may have reached the
correct result in determining that the child would refuse resuscitation,
courts need to be more honest about what they in fact are doing. The
court had no basis upon which to make a decision about what this child
would have said based on her "considered judgments" before the
unfortunate accident had occurred.'"
While it is clear that a child not yet the age of one cannot be
assumed to have the requisite competence to make an informed,
autonomous decision, it is equally clear that someone slightly below the
age of majority might well have the requisite abilities. Consider someone
who, while a minor, decides in a "serious and deliberative manner" that
he would not want to be maintained in a persistent vegetative state should
he be reduced to such a state.'49 Had the person been an adult, a court
would have allowed the patient's wishes to be respected."s However,
given the minority of the individual, the court could not act so summarily.
An additional finding that the person had been sufficiently mature to
make such a judgment would be required.'
Thus, although a court

14.see MEYERs, supra note 14, § 11:25, at 241-44.

'*In re CA., 603 N.E.2d 1171, 1180 (111. App. Ct. 1992) (noting that the
determination of whether a proposed cause of action is in actually [sic] in the ch's best
interests may be subject to differing opinions.").
47 In re Beth, 587 N.E.2d 1377, 1378 (Mass. 1992).
'"Id. at 1383 (Nolan, J., dissenting) ("The trial judge did not have a smidgen of
evidence on which to conclude that if this child who is now about five and one half years
old were competent to decide she would elect certain death to a life with no cognitive

ability.).
149In re Swan, 569 A.2d 1202, 1203 (Me. 1990) (holding that a minor's pre-accident
decision that he did not wish to be kept alive in a persistent vegetative state should be

respected).
15.
In re Gardner, 534 A.2d 947, 953, 956 (Me. 1987).

..See Swan, 569 A.2d at 1205.
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could respect an articulated wish despite the persons minority" if it could
be established by "clear and convincing evidence"'' 3 that the minor had
been sufficiently mature and had considered the question in a "clear and
deliberative' manner," it would not follow as a matter of law that the wish
would be respected.
The person who is only a month short of attaining majority should have
his clear wishes respected, assuming that all other conditions are met. As the
U.S. Supreme Court pointed out in PlannedParenthoodof CentralMissouri
v. Danforth: "Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being
magically only when one attains the state-defined age of majority. Minors as
well as adults
are protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional
5

rights.

'15

Suppose that an incompetent had not been sufficiently mature and
deliberative to decide what course of action to take. A court might nonetheless take into consideration what that individual would have wanted by
looking at expressed discomfort or pain as a way of measuring how
disagreeable a particular procedure was." Such a process would not
involve a claim that the individual had made a rational and deliberative
judgment either about whether to have treatment or about what kind of
treatment to have, but merely a claim about how onerous the burden imposed
by the treatment might be.'3 The New York Court of Appeals had to
decide whether a terminally ill adult cancer patient with an infant's mentality
should receive blood transfusions.'m The court considered how onerous the
treatment would be and decided that the transfusions should be administered
because they "did not involve excessive pain"'59 Basically, the court
15

Id at 1203, 1205.

mT Id.at 1203.
4 Id.
- 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976) (citations onitted) (holding that the state may not require a
generally applicable provision for anunmaried minorto attain an abortion inihe first 12 weeks
of pregnancy "provided she is sufficiently mature to understand the procedure and to make an
intelligent assessment of her circumstances wi the advice of her physician!).
"5See In re Hier, 464 N.E.2d 959, 965 (Mass. App. CL 1984); In re Storar, 438
N.Y.S.2d 266, 275-76 (1981).
1-7
See Hier, 464 N.E.2d at 964-65 ("The expressions of opposition by Mrs. Elier,
while those of an incompetent person, and thus not to be given legal effect, are
nevertheless to be taken into consideration in applying the substituted judgment test
because they are indicative of the burden that she feels in being subjected to advanced
medical technologies.").
" In re Storar, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981) (holding that blood transfusions which did
not cause excessive pain and which were necessary for the incompetent patient's health

shauld be continued).
" Id at 275-76.

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol 83

decided that it would be in the best interests of the individual to receive
that treatment'
Arguably, the case which is farthest from the paradigm involving an
autonomous decisionmaker is one involving an individual who has always
had an infant's mental age. Some courts have suggested that the
appropriate approach in such cases is the best interests test.'6 However,
other approaches have been suggested; for example, a court might believe
it reasonable to assume that an individual who has never been capable of
mature decisionmaking would, if competent, have chosen as the patient's
close family members would have chosen."6 Even were this assumption
borne out statistically, to use it as a basis for substituted judgment would
be to stand substituted judgment on its head. The whole point of
substituted judgment is to figure out what the patient would have said
with her own values and deliberative processes had she been competent
and had she been confronted with the existing circumstances.
It is
bad enough that practicalities require that guesses be made in light of
such factors as the patient's past articulations of values or preferences; it
is much worse when the values themselves must be supplied.
B. On Straining the Limits of Paradigms
When a theoretical paradigm does not allow certain results to be
achieved, a few different options are available. One might accept the
limitations of the theory and say that a particular outcome is not possible
because of those limitations.'" Alternatively, one might adopt a new
theory to cover those cases which seem to be outside the scope of the
'6 Id. The court's decision went against the suggestion of the patient's mother who

had argued that it would be in the best interests of the patient not to receive transfusions.
Id. at 268, 275-76.
" See DeGrella ex rel. Parrent v. Elston, 858 S.W.2d 698, 705 (Ky. 1993)
(suggesting that best interest is "synonymous with the decision the ward would choose
to make if conscious and competent to do so"); In re Custody of a Minor, 379 N.E.2d
1053, 1065 (Mass. 1978) (noting that "the best interest analysis ... requires a court to
focus on the various factors unique to the situation of the individual for whom it must
act"); Cantor, supra note 35, at 259 (noting that 'Ipmesons are presumed to act in their own
best interests, and efforts to discern a patient's unexpressed preferences will stress the

patient's best interests").
'2 Mack v. Mack, 618 A.2d 744, 772 (Md. 1993) (Chasanow, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part) ('It is reasonable to assume that an infant or incompetent child, if
capable of rendering a decision, would reflect the values and views of parents and close
family members.).
1 See MEYERS, supra note 14, § 11:6, at 215.
16 Id. § 11:10, at 287-88.
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first theory.'" Or, one might simply expand the old theory, perhaps
beyond its theoretical constraints, to accommodate a perceived good.'"
Arguably, the substituted judgment approach has been modified
beyond its theoretical limits to achieve good results - for example,
allowing someone to escape an agonizing existence despite her never
having previously given any indication that she would choose that option
and her currently being unable to express such a view."6 Yet, that same
result might be achieved in other ways, such as using a best interests
analysis. Further, some of the costs of expanding a paradigm beyond its
theoretical limits might thereby be avoided. For example, the court in In
re Hier rejected an analysis of the substituted judgment approach offered
in another jurisdiction because that analysis did not allow the "withholding of life-prolonging measures to a patient incompetent to make the
decision for himselt unless the patient (1) had, at some time, been
competent, and (2) had expressed a wish when competent not to receive
such measures."'" Because the purpose of substituted judgment is "to
secure to incompetent persons the same right to choose or reject treatment
that is accorded to competent persons by the law of consent,"' the
Hier court believed that the purpose was not being served by such a
narrow construction of the doctrine.' The court's point that a narrow
construction of substituted judgment does not serve the purposes of the
doctrine is well taken.'
Nonetheless, while narrow constructions

' See id. at 288 ("To rely on the substituted judgment rule where the patient has not
expressed his views as to the treatment in question, neither specifically nor in general, is
to cloud the issue.); see also Dresser, supra note 33, at 378-79 ("By failing to articulate
clearly the proper components of the substituted judgment standard and the evidence
necessary for its application, these courts have exposed themselves to charges that they
covertly subordinated the interests of seriously ill incompetent patients in favor of
economic and other third-party concer:n .
'6 See MEYERS, supra note 14, § 11:6, at 215.
1" In re Hier, 464 N.E.2d 959, 963 (Mass. App. Ct. 1984) (criticizing In re Storar,
438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981), which explicitly rejected the substituted judgment approach).
"' Id.
17'Id at 963-64.
- Ironically, it is not clear that the court actually analyzed what in fact the patient
would have wanted or what would have promoted her own interests. See Dresser, supra
note 33, at 386:
The Hier decisio is vulnerable to criticism on two grounds. First, in detenining whether the operation would benefit Hier, the court omitted a comprehen-

sive examination of her interests. ... Second, the court interpreted Bier's
resistance as representing a concern with privacy and dignity. Yet the facts
presented in the opinion fail to supply any basis for this interpretation.
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should be avoided, very broad constructions such as performing
substituted judgment for someone with a permanent mental age of
a one-year-old should also be avoided. Otherwise, there is a great
danger that the whole purpose of substituted judgment could be subvert-

ed.17

Some courts and commentators have suggested that in the case of
incompetents, the substituted judgment test is equivalent to the best
interests test.173 Yet, it must be remembered that substituted judgment

is not designed to reflect the best judgment - it is designed to reflect the
person's own judgment. 4 The two tests should not be conflated.
Patients sometimes make mistakes because of unrealistic expectations"

or emotional considerations.Y

If the person has competently and

clearly expressed her wishes and has been adequately informed, those
wishes must be carried out, even if reasonable people would have chosen
differently. 177 The New Jersey Supreme Court has suggested that even
if nontreatment would promote a patient's best interests, a court must
nonetheless refuse to choose that option if the individual had made clear
that she wanted the non-optimal treatment.1 78 To suggest that substitut-

ed judgment and best interests analyses are equivalent may lead courts
'72See MEYERS, supra note 14, § 11:6, at 216.
7

See In re Custody of a Minor, 379 N.E.2d 1053, 1065 (Mass. 1978) ("In a case

like this one involving a child who is incompetent by reason of his tender years, we think
that the substituted judgment doctrine is consistent with the 'best interests of the child'
test."); Cantor, supra note 35, at 259 ('here substituted judgment is based on the
presumed rather than the actual intentions of the now incompetent, the formula should
yield essentially the same results as a 'best interests' of the patient standard.").
'- Buchanan, supra note 27, at 389-90 ("The right of self-determination, both for
competents and incompetents, is understood to include the right to refuse treatment even
when such refusal would be neither in one's best interest, nor in agreement with what
most rational or reasonable persons would elect to do in similar circumnstances.").
'73As illustrated in David V. Schapira, The Right to Die: Perspectives of the Patient,
the Family, and the Health Care Provider, in To DIE OR NOT TO DIE? 3, 4 (Arthur S.
Berger & Joyce Berger eds., 1990):
The majority of patients felt they would live at least three years or longer, and
an appreciable percentage felt they would "beat the cancer." In fact, over 75
percent of the patients expired within a year of participating in the study. If
patients have a very optimistic view of their prognosis, discussions regarding
resuscitation may seem incongruous.
176Id. at 4-5.
7 Buchanan, supra note 27, at 389 n.17.
1 In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1232 (N.J. 1985) (holding that "even in the context
of severe pain, life-sustaining treatment should not be withdrawn frm an incompetent
patient who had previously expressed a wish to be kept alive in spite of any pain that he

might experience").
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and guardians to mistakenly believe that substituted judgment is
appropriate only when the "correct" decision is being made.'79
Suppose that nontreatment were deemed by a court to promote the
patient's best interests. If best interests and substituted judgment were
equivalent, then the court could feel comfortable in presuming that the
individual would have chosen nontreatment. Yet, someone who believed
in the sacredness of life might not have made that choice. Indeed, even
if the court knew that the person would not have made that choice, the
court might be tempted to ignore the patient's wishes because of a belief
that her "true" choice would have been to promote her own "best
interests."'80
Consider a judgment which held that it would be in the best interests
of a patient to have a treatment (X) and that a different course of
treatment (Y) would be non-optimal. Such a judgment might mean that:
(a) reasonable, informed people would prefer X, even though Y is an
acceptable second-best choice; or (b) X is so much more preferable than
Y that no competent individual would even consider the latter acceptable.18' The latter is an extremely strong position, which would imply that
if X represents a course of nontreatment and Y represents a form of
treatment, then individuals who believed life to be sacred and thus desired
aggressive treatment would be considered to be acting unreasonably as
a matter of law. By the same token, a court which held that treatment
would be in the best interests of the patient would hold that it would be
unreasonable as a matter of law not to prolong life in the existing
circumstances. Conflation of the notions of best interests and substituted
judgment might lead courts to ignore option (a) because such courts
would never believe that a non-optimal treatment could nonetheless be
acceptable to reasonable, informed people.
Best interests and substituted judgment are equivalent only if the
patient could not while competent have chosen the non-optimal treatment
- ie., only if the choice of the non-optimal treatment was unreasonable
as a matter of law and thus could not have been made by a competent
17

See MEYERs, supra note 14, § 11:6, at 219-20.

Id.
But see ROBERT M. VEATcH, DEATH, DYING, AND THE BIOIoGIcAL REVOLUTION
131 (1989), arguing:
Were someone to argue that there is "benefit" in preserving even pennently
'

vegetative life, there is no scientific argument in opposition. It simply violates
the insights of most religious and secular systems of morals and values. While
not everyone must agree, there is plausibility to the position that society ought
not override the surrogate who reaches such a conclusion in good faith.
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person.' In many cases, a particular treatment would indeed promote
the patient's best interests even though alternative treatments would not
be unreasonable as a matter of law." To talk about the equivalence of

substituted judgment and best interests might induce courts to ignore a
whole set of options - those non-optimal treatments which an informed,
competent individual might nonetheless have chosen.
Substituted judgment and best interests are different tests designed to
do different things. The former is designed to capture what the patient
would have said if competent, while the latter is designed to promote the

patient's best interests."

The two need not coincide, and courts make

a mistake when implying that they must.8 5
C. Best Interests
When autonomy cannot be used as a paradigm, some version of the
best interests test should be used."s The guardian might use an objective best interests test in which the formerly articulated values or
preferences of the patient are completely ignored or, instead, might use
a more subjective test in which those values or preferences are allowed
to play a role." Traditionally, the best interests test is an objective
determination in which the patient's previously expressed preferences or
values are considered irrelevant." The Supreme Court of Wisconsin
182Id. at 114-15.
18. See

id.

'" MEYERS, supra note 14, § 11:6, at 215-20.
15 Id.

Mack v. Mack, 618 A.2d 744, 759 (Md. 1993) ('Best interest is not based on the
patient's right of self-determination as to whether treatment should be received or rejected,
because the absence of any conclusion as to the patient's judgment on that issue is
precedent to applying the best interest analysis.'; In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1231
(N.J. 1985) (noting that "the state's parens patride power supports the authority of its
courts to allow decisions to be made for an incompetent that serve the incompetent's best
interests, even if the person's wishes cannot be clearly established'); In re Guardianship
of Grant, 747 P.2d 445, 457 (Wash. 1987) (holding that "where it cannot be ascertained
what choice the patient would make if competent . . . ,the guardian must make a goodfaith determination of whether the withholding of life sustaining treatment would serve
the incompetent patient's best interests"); In re L.W., 482 N.W.2d 60, 68 (Wis. 1992)
("IT]he common law, where the individual was never competent or where the conduct of
the individual while competent never was of a kind from which one could draw a
reasonable inference upon which to make a substituted judgment, requires that decision
to be resolved by a surrogate decision maker acting in the best interests of the

incompetent.").
1 See MEYERS, supra note 14, § 11:6, at 217, 220.
m Cf.John D. Gorby, Admissibility and Weighing Evidence of Intent in Right to Die
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has suggested that past statements of someone who is currently incompetent will not be considered in best interests analysis. 1' The question for
the decisionmaker will be what the reasonable person would want
done. °
In order for treatment to be withdrawn using the objective best
interests test, the burdens of continued life must outweigh the benefits."9 However, this balancing standard does not mean that if the
burdens posed by treatment would slightly outweigh the benefits, then no
treatment should be given. The Supreme Court of New Jersey has
suggested that in order to withhold treatment, "the recurring, unavoidable
and severe pain of the patient's life with the treatment should be such that
the effect of administering life-sustaining treatment would be inhumane."'9 2 Yet, to hold that only inhumane administrations of lifesustaining treatments may be withheld under the objective best interests
standard may be too difficult a standard to meet. The Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts worried that incompetent individuals might be
forced to undergo procedures that competent individuals would not
choose for themselves and suggested that such a policy devalues the
worth of incompetent human beings."' Regrettably, a state which
Casea, 6 IsSUEs L. & MED. 33, 34-35 (1990) (noting that 'f the 'meaningfulness' of the
patient's life in an objective sense is determinative, the patient's comments and thoughts
about living on a respirator in a vegetative state may be of no importance or relevance

to the court in making its judgment).
9LW., 482 N.W.2d at 70 (noting that "the best interests standard focuses solely on

what is currently in the patient's best interests"). But see CANTOR, suipra note 68, at 70
(concluding that "deference to the personal value systems of the patient... might serve
a useful function, even under what would normally be a purely objective best interests
frmula? .
1

oSee LW., 482 N.W.2d at 70.

'9'MEYERS, supra note 14, § 11:6, at 217 ("Under the best interests standard, the
surrogate decision-maker attempts to decide whether ... or not the benefits offered by
the medical treatment are sufficient to outweigh the burdens that it imposes.").
w In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1232 (N.J. 1985); see also In re Moorhouse, 593
A.2d 1256, 1259 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991) (explaining that, in New Jersey, a

guardian may withhold or withdraw life-sustaining medical treatment if it is clear that
the subjective test; the limited-objective test, or the pure-objective test has been
met).
Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewic, 370 N.E.2d 417, 428
(Mass. 1977) ('To presume that the incompetent person must always be subjected to what

many rational and intelligent persons may decline is to downgrade the status of the
incompetent person by placing a lesser value on his intrinsic human worth and vitality.');
see also CANTOR, supra note 68, at 93 (noting that "courts promote the hinnan dignity

of[always-incompetent] patients by affording access to beneficial results which competent
patients could, and likely would, choose under similar circumstances").

772
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adopts the New Jersey standard might well force incompetents to undergo
such procedures."
Some courts have suggested that continuing the life of someone in a
persistent vegetative state 95 would be against that person's best interests.196 Such a determination implies that objective criteria are used to
evaluate what indeed would be in the best interests of such a patient'
and that it may objectively be best for someone to die.'98 This position

I" The New Jersey Supreme Court also adopted a modified best interests test in
which the subjective preferences of the patient were taken into account and in which the
objective component did not involve as strict a standard. See Conmry, 486 A.2d at 1232.
Nonetheless, the unmodified objective best interests test - ie., the "pure" best interests
test - makes use of a standard which may be unduly difficult to meet. Id. at 1233.
' MEYERS, supra note 14, § 4:3, at 27 (noting that a 'prson in a 'persistent
vegetative state'... will never regain consciousness, cannot speak, think, feel or emote,
but ... breathes and maintains basic metabolic functions of body heat, pulse, food
conversion, and elimination!'.
L5In re Guardianship of Myers, 610 N.E.2d 663, 670 (C.P. Summit Co. Ohio 1993)
(suggesting that maintaining someone in a persistent vegetative state, "when there is no
hope for recovery, is not only against the best interest, but is inhumane"); see also Marvin
M. Moore, The Case for Voluntaiy Euthanasia, 42 UMKC L. REv. 327, 336 (1974)
(noting that such individuals need '"not to be relieved of pain, but rather, to be
unburdened of an irrational, meaningless existence whose prolongation provides no
benefits to themselves or to those about them"); Yuen, supra note 76, at 623 (noting that
"the vast majority of people would choose death over existence in a vegetative state
attached to life-sustaining equipment with only a negligible chance of emerging from
unconsciousness and a high probability of brain damage if they were to emerge').
sc Mitchell ex rel. Rasmussen v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674, 689 (Ariz. 1987) ("Under
the best interests standard, the surrogate decisionmaker assesses what medical treatment
would be in the patient's best interests as detennined by such objective criteria as relief
from suffering, preservation or restoration of functioning, and quality and extent of
sustained life:).
L' As explained by Cantor, supra note 35, at 257:
Even where a patient has reached an irreversibly comatose state in which all
feeling and awareness have ceased, best interests cannot automatically be
equated with continued existence. ... To the extent that withdrawal of life
support reflects what the comatose patient would have wanted done, such a
course can also be viewed as being in the patient's best interests.
Richard Sherlock, Liberalism, Public Policy and the Life Not Worth Living: Abraham
Lincoln on Beneficent Euthanasia, 26 AM. J. JuRis. 47, 51 (1981) (noting that "what the
defenders of the various forms of euthanasia must argue for is a publicly announced, nonarbitrary standard that specifies some human lives as having those characteristics that
render them not worth living"). But see In re Doe, 583 N.E.2d 1263, 1276-77 (Mass.
1992) (O'Connor, J., dissenting):
[Ihe court's approval of the withdrawal of Jane Doe's nutrition and hydration
is given for Jane Doe's benefit That leads me to ask how she benefits from an
early death. She is not burdened by life. She need not "go" to be in peace. For
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presents at least two difficulties. First, if it would be in the best interest
of one person in a persistent vegetative state to have treatment with-

drawn,' and there isno role in that determination played by the intent
or values of the patient, then it would seem that all patients in a
persistent vegetative state should have treatment withheld or withdrawn,2
even if they had expressed preferences to the contrary while
still competent?"' Second, the objective, reasonable person standard is
less determinative than might first appear," since it is unclear what

benefits or burdens to include in a cost-benefit analysis involving
individuals in a persistent vegetative state. 3 For example, it is unclear

whether the prolongation of life is itself a benefit for such an individual.24 Ifso, then extending the life of someone in a persistent vegetative
state might be thought to promote that person's interests °5
Arguably, where the patient is permanently unconscious and can feel

no pain whatsoever, it does not make sense to talk about promoting her
best interests because there are no interests to promote.2 ' Yet, such a

all that appears, with food and drink and care she can "stay" in peace.
In re L.W., 482 N.W.2d 60, 72-73 (Wis. 1992) ("For an incompetent patient in a
persistent vegetative state, such as L.W., there may be a point at which as objectively
viewed it is in his or her best interests to refuse further medical treatment".
'oSee Mack v. Mack, 618 A.2d 744, 761 (Md. 1993) ("[A] conclusion that it is in
[the patient's] best interest to die would be based on his existence in a persistent
vegetative state. That being the precedent, artificially administered sustenance should be
withheld firom all persons in a persistent vegetative state... :).
0
"tBut see id. at 760 (noting that if the patient had expressed a preference for
treatment under those cirmnstances, that preference would be respected).
= But see LW., 482 N.W.2d at 68 (suggesting that for someone in a persistent
vegetative state, a "dignified and natural death may outweigh the interest of maintaining
a physiological life as long as medically possible").
2 But see In re Peter, 529 A.2d 419, 425 (N.J. 1987) (holding that cost-benefit
analyses "should not be applied to patients in the persistent vegetative state").
20 Compare Buchanan, supra note 27, at 402 (discussing "the implausible assertion
that it is in the patient's best interest to die, even when life can be preserved without
suffering") with PAUL RAmSEY, ETHICS AT THE EDGES OF LiuE 269 (1978) (stating that
"no treatment is beneficial to a comatose dying patient when it can alter the dying process
-in no way and serves only to prolong if').
' See Buchanan, supra note 27, at 402 ("[Rlegardless of whether one assumes that
the patient's vegetative state is reversible or ireversible, the best interest standard requires
perpetual support for every such patient.").
z'Edward M. Scher, Comment, Legal Aspects ofEguzahasia, 36 ALB. L. REv. 674,
689 (1972) ("[TIhe hypothetical patient ...[is] pemanently unconscious and feels no
pain whatsoever. In this situation, the best interest criterion seems to make no sense.").
But see Buchanan, supra note 27, at 402 ("[A]ssuming the patient is in a vegetative state
and therefore will experience no pain from treatment, the best interest standard would
'
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view raises serious questions about whether someone who is alive and
thus presumptively has interests is wrongly being treated as if she had
none.207 Even were it appropriate to treat individuals who are permanently unconscious and unable to feel pain as not having interests, courts
would still have to decide what would promote the best interests of
incompetents who could feel pain. The court in Foody v. Manchester
Memorial Hospital suggested: "If the exercise of the right is to be
maintained where no expression has been made by an incompetent patient
as to treatment, it must take place within the context of an analysis which
seeks to implement what is in that person's best interests by reference to
objective societally shared criteria."2" Here, the best interests analysis
is "objective" - criteria which are agreed upon by society will be used,
even if there is no evidence that the patient herself would have used those
criteria when making the relevant decision 2'
If indeed societal criteria are to be used, some agreement must be
reached about what those criteria are. The Foody court offered some of
the relevant criteria: the nature of the treatment, the length of time life
would be extended, and the quality of life possible with treatment2 0
Within that quality of life consideration might be an analysis of whether
the individual would have any cognitive function after treatment2 "
Yet it is misleading to suggest that there is a societal consensus
about which factors should be considered in best interests analysis and
how heavily those different factors should be weighed. 2' For example,

seem to require resuscitation ...

.
' See infra note 315 and accompanying text.
2 482 A.2d 713, 721 (Corn. Super. Ct. 1984) (holding that "the family lawfully may

act as the patient's substitute decision-maker and may decide to discontinue the use of the

respirator').
2M

Id.

210 Id.

at 718-19; see also In re Doe, 583 N.E.2d 1263, 1268 (Mass. 1992) (holding
that analysis of all the evidence and the facts and circumstances, includin an assessment

of the patient's quality of life, supported a finding that the subjective judgment of an
incompetent patient who if competent would request withdrawal or withholding of
treatment should be respected).
21 See In re L.H.R., 321 S.E.2d 716, 722 (Ga. 1984) (holding that one of the factors
was whether a "reasonable possibility of attaining (or regaining) cognitive function"

eidsted).
21 In re lobes, 529 A.2d 434, 458 (N.J. 1987) (Handler, J., concurring) ("A 'best
interests' standard assumes a consensus that is not there regarding when discontinuation
of treatment is in a patient's best interests."). Even were there a consensus, it might still
be inappropriate to take a survey and impose the result on the patient See Superiftedent
of Belchertown State Sch. v. Salkewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 428 (Mass. 1977) ("Nor do
statistical factors indicating that a majority of competent persons similarly situated choose
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the New Jersey Supreme Court seems to find pain to be the most

important factor in an objective best interests analysis - as is indicated
by its holding that the condition for nontreatment is that "the recurring,
unavoidable and severe pain of the patient's life with the treatment should
be such that21the
effect of administering life-sustaining treatment would be
3
umane.
ni
While pain should be a factor in any objective best interests analysis,

it should not be the only factor 1

The patient who is, "marginally

cognitive"2 5 may have feelings of frustration, helplessness, rage,
contentment, satisfaction, and joy, although they may be difficult to
quantify.21 6 Patients also have an interest in having a dignified

death.2 7 Indeed, some individuals reject pain-controlling drugs to avoid
a stupor, with the accompanying loss of alertness or consciousness,
precisely because of dignity considerations. 2 8
Death with dignity might involve two very different sorts of

considerations: the current feelings and beliefs of the patient 2' and the
treatment resolve the issue. The significant decisions of life are more complex than

statistical determinations.).
21

2

In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1232 (N.J. 1985).
See id. at 1247 (Handler, I., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (suggesting that

the court's concentration on pain "eclipses a whole cluster of other human values that
have a proper place in the subtle weighing that will ultimately determine how life should
end"); Mary R. Barrington, Apologia for Suicide, in EUTHANASIA AND THE RIGHT TO
DEATH 152, 155 (A.B. Downing ed., 1969) (stating that "analgesics willnot help a patient
to live with total incontinence, reduced to the status of a helpless baby after a life of
independent adulthood"); Carl, suqra note 12, at 534 ("Pain is only one form of suffering.
There is extreme fatigue, oftentimes itching, incontinence, and a host of other symptoms."); Moore, supra note 196, at 336 ("Terminally ill patients are, depending on the
specific affliction, often tormented by one or more of the following- nausea, giddiness,
incontinence of the bowels and/or bladder, partial or total paralysis, shortness of breath,

difficulty in swallowing, compulsive coughing, and blinduess'").
21 In re Peter, 529 A.2d 419, 425 (N.J. 1987) (noting the difficulty medical experts
have in determining the mental and emotional capacities of those patients unable to
communicate verbally).
26
Id. at 424-25.
" In re Guardianship of Grant, 747 P.2d 445, 451 (Wash. 1987) ("The individual's
right to die with dignity must not be ignored.").
21 Stephen A. Newman, Euthanasia" Orchestrating "The Last Syllable of Ylme, ' 53
U. Prr L. REV. 153, 185 (1991) ('Some people will reject the invitation to choose drugs
that induce mental stupor in order to avoid pain. For the incurably ill, losing alertness,
control and even consciousness may not be acceptable as a way to prolong existence:)
(footnote omitted). But see CUNDIPF, supra note 37, at 116-17 ("Although patients may
become unusually sleepy for two or three days after beginning appropriate doses of oral
morphine, they soon return to being alert and mentally sharp.").
In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1233 (N.J. 1985) ("The right of an adult who...
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past feelings and beliefs of the patient while competent n ° If only the
current feelings and beliefs of the patient are taken into account, then a
permanently insensate person cannot have her dignity violated by
treatment because she will never become aware of that treatment.
However, if having one's dignity respected includes considering one's past
feelings and beliefs, than extending the life of a patient in a way which
runs counter to the patient's past feelings and beliefs would not allow her
to die with
dignity, even if she would never become aware of that
T

indignit.

While it seems clear that a permanently insensate individual could be
treated in a way that offends her dignity, even if she never become aware
of that undignified treatment, it is important to establish the basis for this
reasoning. If such treatment would be offensive because it would violate
the past expressed beliefs and attitudes of the patient, then it would seem
that someone who was now insensate and had never expressed such
attitudes would be unprotected. m Yet, even for those individuals, there
is a sense that certain kinds of treatment "objectively" offend their
dignitytm Thus, death with dignity does not require that the patient
herself is conscious of what is being done - an individual may be and
always have been insensate and nonetheless be thought to be treated in
a way which violates her dignity tm

was once competent to determine the course of her medical treatment remains intact even
when she is no longer able to assert that right or to appreciate its effectuation.").
' In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 444 (N.J. 1987) ("[W]here an incompetent's wishes are

not clearly expressed, a surrogate decisionmaker considers the patient's value system for
guidance.").
" A separate question is whether the family's view of what a dignified death would
involve corresponds to what the patient, while competent, would have said. See Cruzan
v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 286 (1990) (holding that there is "no
automatic assurance that the view of close family members will necessarily be the same
as the patient's would have been had she been confronted with the prospect of her
situation while competenfl'.
' See, e.g., In re Doe, 583 N.E.2d 1263, 1268 (Mass. 1992) (noting that the situation
is similar to that of an infant who had not yet formed the necessary mental processes to

express its will).
2' See Jobes, 529 A.2d at 444 (noting that "the individual's right to privacy becomes
stronger 'as the degree of bodily invasion [effected by the medical treatment at issue]

increases and the prognosis [for recovery to a cognitive, sapient state] dims.').
At some point, such a course of treatment upon the insensate patient is bound
to touch the sensibilities of even the most detached observer .... When

24

cherished values of human dignity and personal privacy, which belong to every
person living or dying, are sufficiently transgressed by what is being done to

the individual, we should be ready to say: enough.
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When considering the various factors which promote the patient's best
interests, one must further decide which values should be used when
making that determination.' One might use society's values (assuming
that a consensus exists)"6 or, instead, use the patient's values
When using the patient's own values, the court or guardian might seem
less open to the charge of paternalism m and less open to the charge
that it is imposing its own values on the patient.

At least two difficulties are posed by a court's or guardian's imposing
its own values on a patient. First, there is no reason to prefer those values

over the values of someone else or society.

Second, even if those

values are "correct' in that they coincide with society's, there is still the

Id. at 459 (Handler, L,concurring) (citation omitted); see also In re Cuardianship of
Crum, 580 N.E.2d 876, 883 (P. Ct. 1991) ("[lIt is the opinion of the court that it is inthe
best interest of Dawn M. Cram to authorize the withdrawal of nutrition and hydration and
allow her to die peacefully, painlessly, and with dignity.").
" H. Tristan Englehardt, Jr. & Michele Malloy, Suicide and Assisting Suicide: A
Critique ofLegal Snctions, 36 Sw. L.L 1003, 1006-07 (1982) ("A judgment of anothde's
best interests requires an ordering of the significance of benefits and banes. This ordering,
however, presupposes a particular moral or evaluational sense, and is therefore irradicably
subjective."); see also Gary U. Schorff, Note, In re Quinlan Revisited- The JudicialRole
in Protecting the Privacy Right of Dying Incompetents, 15 HAsTIGs CONST. L.Q. 479,
499 (1988) ("[Wlhich interest is 'best' for the patient should be determined by the
patient's values.").
=' But see Jobes, 529 A.2d at 457-58 (Handler, J., concurring) ("A 'best interests'
standard assumes a consensus that is not there regarding when discontinuation of
treatment is in a patient's best interests."); Hamam, supra note 56, at 117 ("A best
interest standard assumes a consensus that does not exist in society on the issue of

whether to discontinue treatment').
2
obes, 529 A.2d at 462 (Pollock, ., concurring) ("[T'he patient's preferences ...
should be considered in a best-interests analysis."); Yuen, supra note 76, at 629 ("A
patient's statements regarding medical decisions that do not meet the clear evidence
standard should be considered by the doctor and patient in assessing best interests.").
2 Ronzetti, supra note 58, at 155-56 ("Best interest decisionmaking risks being
paternalistic and denying the patient's values entirely.").
m Joanna K. Weinberg, Whose Right Is It Anyway? Individualism, Commmi, and
the Right to Die: A Commentary on the New Jersey Experience, 40 HAsTNGS L. 119,
127 (1988) ("[J]udges and protective service agencies have had considerable discretion
in making decisions and in applying the best interests doctrine. As a result, they often
have been accused of abusing their discretion by applying their own social values and
standards." (footnote omitted)); see also Dresser, supra note 33, at 388 (arguing that
"attempts to incorporate reasonable person values in the best interests standard yield
confusion and potential abuse").
o See Ikuta, supra note 35, at 42 ("If a third party, no matter how well intentioned,
makes a choice for [another] individual, the choice can no longer be called autonomous. ).
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difficulty that the patient own values seem to be ignoredL 1 The Supreme
Court of Illinois has suggested that use of the best interests test with its
objective criteria and analysis seems to undermine the "foundation of
self-determination and inviolability of the person upon which the right to
refuse medical treatment stands."232
One cannot talk about the patient' values ifthe patient had never formed
or developed any values or any deliberative capacities. 23 The difficulty
with imputing values to such a person would not merely be that such a
patient would never have expressed a view about whether she would want
treatment continued in a particular situatione but that she would not have
been able to form an opinion or even to have developed values. In such
a case, it makes sense to use an objective best interests test, because another
viable option does not seem to be available. Nonetheless, one should not
claim that one is thereby doing what the patient would have done but should
admit that one is using a different test which does not claim to predict what
the patient herself would have decided.'

SFAMILY, =HCouRTs, AND LIAILrrY
A.

Family

Arguably, in those cases in which the incompetent has not left
explicit directions about her care, family members should make the

2" See Jobes, 529 A.2d at 457 (noting that the approach involving the substituted
judgment of another is "fraught with guesswork' and expresses concern for the patient
rather than determining what his actual wishes would be).
2 In re Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292, 299 (IML1989) (holding that the guardian of a
comatose patient may exercise the patients right to terminate artificial life support); Liacos,
supra note 21, at 221 ("Allowing others to decide what is objectively in a patient's best interest
demeans the person's humanity by ignoring the subjective wishes and circumstances of the
individual on whose behalf the decision is ostensibly being made'J.
3 In re Doe, 583 N.E.2d 1263, 1268 (Mass. 1992) (concluding that 'in situations in
which there is an attempt to use substituted judgment for a never-competent person, it is
a legal fiction!'; In re Colyer, 660 P.2d 738, 745 (Wash. 1983) (holding that a guardian
cannot use best judgment to exercise the "patient's personal choice" where the patient has
"always been severely retarded").
' See In re Hamlin, 689 P.2d 1372, 1374 (Wash. 1984) (concluding that "patient has
been severely mentally retarded since birth, therefore never expressing his wishes about
termination of life support").
= See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
But see MEYERS, supra note 14, § 11:15, at 302 ("Absent prior, relevant,

competent expressions by the patient, that reasonable minds believe it best for the patient,
or in his best interests, is perhaps the best test for determining what the patient would
have decided, if competent to do so.').
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necessary decisions 7 Family members would be more likely to know
what the patient would have wanted and, further, would seem more likely

to have the best interests of the patient at heart.m In many jurisdictions, medical decisionmaking is generally left to the family in consulta-

tion with the medical community, 2 ' although some courts will allow
a patient's family to decide to withdraw treatment only where there is
evidence that the patient has no reasonable chance of returning to a

cognitive state. 4
When a family member is acting as a guardian, she, like any other
guardian, is supposed to make a treatment decision using either a

substituted judgment or a best interests analysis 2 " If substituted
judgment is used, it might seem plausible that family members would
have the most intimate knowledge of the patient and thus could most
accurately reflect the judgment the patient would have made.? 2 Yet,
23 7

Beschle, supra note 35, at 364 ("A strong argument can be made that a delegation
of decision maling power from society as a whole to a relative or other surrogate is the
best resolution of the question of where to locate those decision making powers.'); Yuen,
supra note 76, at 605-06 (noting that "the patient's family is regarded as the appropriate

surrogate decfiiomaker).
23 CANCroR, supra note 68, at 107.
' In re Doe, 418 S.E.2d 3, 6 (Ga. 1992) ("[Mledical decision-making for
incompetent patients is most often best left to the patient's family (or other designated
proxy) and the medical community."); In re lobes, 529 A.2d 434, 445 (N.J. 1987)

('family members are best qualified to make substituted judgments for incompetent
patients.").
24
As the court explained in Foody v. Manchester Memorial Hospital, 482 A.2d 713,
721 (Conn. Super. Ct 1984):
Where the incapable patient's condition ... is permanent and irreversible and
there is no reasonable medical probability that the patient ever will return to a
cognitive state [and two other conditions are met] .... the family lawfully may
act as the patient's substitute decision-maker and may decide to discontinue the
use of the respirator.
See John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921, 926 (Fla. 1984)
("The focal point of such decisions [to terminate life-support] should be whether there is
a reasonable medical expectation ofthe patient's return to a cognitive life as distinguished
from the forced continuance of a vegetative existence.").
"' See In re Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292, 299 (111. 1989) ("The courts have generally
employed one of two theories in ascertaining an incompetent patient's best wishes: 'best
interests' or 'substituted judgment"').
242
Jobes, 529 A.2d at 457 (Handler, J.,concurring) (concluding that 'itimate
knowledge of a friend or relative allows the formulation of a reliable opinion about how
the patient would react to the situation, even if that person had never previously
experienced or expressed views upon such a situation"); MEYERS, supra note 14, § 6:9,
at 104 ("The family usually knows most about the patient's preferences.'); Yuen, supra
note 76, at 626 (stating that "some close family members ...are uniquely suited to
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some commentators suggest that such intimate knowledge should not be
presumed2 3 There is reason to doubt that family members know their
loved one's preferences as well as they might think, even when the
individuals have been living together for a long time." A further
complicating factor is that in our very mobile society, family members
may live far apart and thus may no longer know each other very well at
alLY" Indeed, even if the family members live close to each other, they
may not see each other very often. For example, elderly individuals who
live in nursing homes may not have much contact with their family, and
the family may thus be unable to adequately protect their interests?"
Arguably, even if the family members no longer know each other
very well, they will still have the best interests of the patient at heart and
thus no other guardian need be appointed to assure that those interests are
protectede 7 Yet, there is reason to believe that a stranger who was
appointed guardian would also have the patient's best interests at heart,
so long as the guardian did not have a financial interest in the outcome.2 " If the guardian did have a financial interest - for example, if
the guardian were employed by a hospital that had an interest in

determine whether the incompetent relative would be likely to consider the quality of
life").
u' Bopp & Avila, supra note 39, at 215 (footnote omitted) (stating that "absent
sufficient evidence of a patient's choices or views about quality of life, there can be no
assurance that even close family members could determine what the patient actually
would choose").
'4 Gieszl & Velasco, supra note 63, at 774 ("In one study, spouses accurately
predicted the other spouse's preference for resuscitation only about one-half the time ....
Other studies document similar disparities in treatment preferences .... ).
"4The same argument can be used to undercut the ability of the physician to know
the patient's preference. See Hamann, supra note 56, at 161.
2" See In re Peter, 529 A.2d 419, 429 (N.J. 1987) (holding that "many elderly rsing
home patients do not have any close family members and even if they do, the relatives
may not be able to adequately represent the patient's interests").
2' See In re lobes, 529 A.2d 434, 447 (N.J. 1987) ("If there are close and caring
family members who are willing to make this decision there is no need to have a guardian
appointed."); see also Thomas Rivosecchi, Comment, MedicalSelf-Determinaion: A Call
for Uniformity, 31 DUQ. L. REV. 87, 92 (1992) ("The frequently practiced procedure is
for the physician and the incompetent patient's family to confer and make treatment
decisions concerning the patient" (footnote omitted)). But see Ikuta, supra note 35, at 43
("In invoking the themes of the loving family and the inclusive community, the court
ignores or covers up the reality that family and community are as likely to have rejecting
as loving attitudes towards the patient:).
24 See, e.g., In re Hamlin, 689 P.2d 1372, 1381 (Wash. 1984) (Rosellini,
.,
dissenting) (stating that disagreement by family members is no reason to disregard the
decision of a court-appointed guardian).
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continuing the care of paying patients for as long as possible - then there
might be reasons to doubt the guardian's objectivity u9
Family members may also have interests adverse to those of the
patient. Suppose that the family is financially responsible for some
or all of the patient's care" or, perhaps, stands to inherit from the es-

tate. The family members would have an interest in avoiding large
medical expenses, although that interest might be outweighed by other
factors.
It is simply unclear what to do when the family has financial or
emotional interests adverse to the interests of the patient. 3 While one
Grace Plaza of Great Neck, Inc. v. Elbaum, 588 N.Y.S.2d 853 (App. Div. 1992)
(involving a patient's family which was forced to pay for unwanted care).
' Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 353 (1990) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (noting that 'insome cases there may be a conflict between the interests of
an incompetent patient and the interests of members of his or her family"); CANToR,
supra note 68, at 108 ("A lingering death can impose emotional and financial strains on
the surrounding family. Or the next of kin asked to make decisions may stand to benefit
financially from the patient's demise - through inheritance or life insurance proceeds.");
Beschle, supra note 35, at 364 (noting that it is "unrealistic to expect a family member
to make a decision about continuing medical ireatment without some consideration of his
or her own values, emotions and, pefhaps, practical concerns such as the financial effect
on the entire family of continued treatment"); Robertson, supra note 25, at 1171 ("The
risk that their decisions will serve the family's own interest instead of the interests of the
incompetent patient is too great to be ignored."); Smith, sipra note 13, at 382 ('The state
must protect the patient from ... families who can no longer bear the social and
economic costs of maintaining the patient's life."); Yuen, supra note 76, at 607-08 (stating
that "personal financial considerations such as inheritance and the financial drain of caring
for an ill person could create pressures to choose withdrawal of treatmenf).
2" Courts do look at the financial interests of the parties. See Foody v. Manchester
Memorial Hosp., 482 A.2d 713, 717 (Cor. Super. Ct 1984) (concluding that the family
'%as no financial interest in the outcome of this proceeding'). Where there is such an
interest, courts seem to react differently. CompareIn re Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292, 300
(111. 1989) (holding that "court intervention is necessary to guard against the remote, yet
rel possibility that greed may taint the judgment of the surrogate decisionmaker) with
Drabick v. Drabick, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840, 861 n.38 (CL App. 1988) (noting that the
conservator has a financial interest but is nonetheless allowed to make a relevant

decision).
According to Hamann, sipra note 56, at 151:
The family members who are forced to make life and death decisions for an
incompetent person are generally the same people who will inherit ifthe person
dies. Moreover, if a person is kept on life support for an extended period of
time, his estate may be drained by the substantial cost, leaving little for the
survivors to inherit.
m See, e.g., CANToR, supra note 68, at 108 (Some authorities have questioned
whether family members are tainted by a potential conflict of interest between their own
interests and the well being of the dying patient").
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could include the costs and benefits to the family in the determination of
what was in the best interests of the patient, it is not at all clear that
such factors should be considered in treatment decisions' unless the
patient would have wanted them considered. 5 While the mere fact that
an adverse financial interest exists does not establish that the family
member will not act in the best interests of the incompetent patient,1
the cases nonetheless pose problems which are not susceptible to easy
solution.'
It might seem that a sensible prophylactic policy would require that
whenever a family member has an adverse financial interest, a decision
to withdraw treatment should be subjected to a disinterested person's
appraisal, such as that of a judge.' Yet, such a policy would ignore
the very real possibility that because of guilt or perhaps as a way to make
sure that finances are not driving the treatment decisions, families may
overcompensate and demand that everything possible be done for the
patientY 9 One could subject all decisions to oversight by having a
Famam v. Crista Ministries, 807 P.2d 830, 848-49 (Wash. 1991) (Dore, C.l.,
concurring in pad, dissenting in part) ("Where a persistently vegetative patient is indeed
completely insensate, this entire debate concerns not the feelings of the teninally ill and
incompetent, but the feelings of family and friends of the unforttmate patient."); Gelfand,
sipra note 35, at 773 ("Who was suffering in the Quinlan case? Certainly not Karen in
her comatose state. The so-called mercy-killing decision in that case was certainly not
intended to end Karen's suffering. The decision ended her family's suffering."). But see
Beschle, supra note 35, at 365 (noting that "society's claim to override the decisions of
the family become stronger if and when society assumes at least the financial consequences of its decision").
25
, Cantor, supra note 35, at 260 ("This problem would be mitigated somewhat if
avoidance of burdens to survivors were considered only when the patient's own
instructions included such factors."). But see CUNDIn, slqra note 37, at 62 ("Trail,
disabled elderly people who are financial and emotional burdens on their families may
feel some pressure to ask for euthanasia to spare their families farther suffering.").
m In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1218 (NJ. 1985) (concluding that "there was no
question that the nephew had good intentions and had no real conflict of interest duoe to
possible inheritance when he sought pennission to remove the tube"); Bamann, sqra note
56, at 152 (stating that for family, financial reasons are 'rarely the prime motivating
factors behind a decision to cease treatment").
2

See CANTOR, supra note 68, at 108-09.

211See

Hita, supra note 35, at 43 (noting that the court is better suited to determine
the best course of action for a patient by securing the necessary information from the
patient's family and by screening outside interests).
Schapira, supranote 175, at 5 ("For reasons of grief or guilt, the family may press
for disproportionately aggressive management ....); id. at 6 ('In order to avoid the
responsibility and guilt associated with adopting a passive approach, they choose a safe
course of action and request that 'everything be done' for the patient").
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court review all decisions,.' but such an approach would not seem to
be a good use of resources. One could preclude all individuals with a
financial interest from making medical decisions for another,"' but this
approach would prevent the people who might care most about the
individual and who might best know what the patient would have wanted
from making the relevant decision.26
Insofar as it is impossible to make a reliable prediction about what
the person would have wanted (and thus substituted judgment cannot be
used) and insofar as best interests is an objective determination which
does not require knowledge of the patient,2 some of the justification
for having a family member as the guardian disappears. The presumed
special knowledge possessed by the family member of the patient's
desires and values is then no longer relevant. Still, there are additional
reasons to have a family member be a guardian - namely, that she would
be more likely to be a zealous advocate for the patient 2 " and the
patient would likely prefer that a family member be the guardian.265
The guardian's duties are varied. Her "procedural duties will involve
drafting and mailing to all interested parties any legal documents affecting
the incapacitated person," as well as "receiving and responding to all
See infra notes 277-95 and accompanying text.
But see Hamann,

qpra note 56, at 152 ("A family member should not be

disqualified from making the decision to withdraw treatment simply because he or she
will benefit from the person's will").
See id.at 154 ("[P]erceived conflict of interest should not be used as a basis for
removing family decisionmaking authority from those who know the person best, who
care most for the person and who the person would probably want to make the
decision"). Indeed, one commentator goes several steps further by suggesting that
individuals who engage in mercy killing should not be precluded from inheriting. See
Kent S. Berk Comment, Mercy Killing and the SNayer Rule: Should the Legislatures
Change Something?, 67 TUL. L. REV. 485, 506-07 (1992) ("For true right to die to exist,
states must allow others to assist individuals who wish to experience that right without
fear of civil forfeiture.').
23 See In re Hamlin, 689 P.2d 1372, 1378 (Wash. 1984) ("The surrogate decision
maker, like a family, provides an objective viewpoint to evaluate the medical prognosis").
26 It seems clear that zealous advocates may be necessary. See Arthur S. Berger, Last
Rights: The View from a U.S. Courthouse, in To DiE oR NOT TO DIE? 129, 140 (Arthur
S. Berger & Joyce Berger eds., 1990) ("One of the chief complaints patients have is that
their living wills are ignored by physicians."); see also Hamann, supra note 56, at 162
(discussing the advocacy role).
20 In re Lawrance, 579 N.E.2d 32, 39 (Ind. 1991) (recognizing that "most Americans
want the decisions about their care, upon their incapacity, to be made for them by family
and physician, rather than by strangers or by govemment").
6 Mitchell ex rel. Rasmussen v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674, 690 (Ariz. 1987) ("A
guardian ad litem is appointed during guardianship proceedings to represent an
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legal documents mailed to the incapacitated person.' 7 The "principal
substantive duty" is to discover and analyze "all facts relevant to medical
treatment of the patient," ie., to act as fact-finder.2 When the incompetent has not previously made clear her treatment wishes, a guardian is
needed to promote the patient's best interests 69 To do so, the guardian
must ascertain what those interests are and, further, act as an advocate to
ensure that those interests are promotede' When courts suggest that the
family will make sure that the patient's best interests will be protected,
they presumably are suggesting that the family will play both roles.2
No matter who is appointed guardian, the potential for difficulties
will loom. Family members may have adverse financial or emotional
interests, while strangers may not care enough to zealously promote the
patient's interests. A choice must be made between the two, and it seems
reasonable to choose the former! 2 Medical personnel can provide a
check on obvious abuses.27 Given that check, it seems most sensible
to appoint a family member as guardian.274 Yet, it is important to note

incapacitated person if such person has no counseL").
=
2 Id.
aId.
See id. at 686-87 (concluding "that Rasmussen's right to refuse medical treatment
still existed despite her incompetency and her failure to articulate her medical desires

prior to becoming incompeten" and that her guardian had standing to enforce that right).
2

o Id. at 689 ("Under the best interests standard, the surrogate decisionmaking
[guardian ad litem] assesses what medical treatment would be in the patient's best interest
as determined by such objective criteria as relief from suffering, preservation or
restoration of functioning, and quality and extent of sustained life.").
r In re CA., 603 N.E.2d 1171, 1180 (111. App. Ct. 1992) ("As primary caregivers,
parents or other close family members ordinarily are the ones charged with making the
difficult determination of what is in a terminally-ill child's best interests.').
2n See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 637-38 (1979) (Brennan, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part) (stating that deference due to parents should not be extended to state
social workers).
' In re Colyer, 660 P.2d 738, 747-49 (Wash. 1983) ("Concurrence by professional
colleagues, who are not attending physicians but who nonetheless have an understanding
of the patient's condition, would protect against erroneous diagnoses as well as
questionable motives.").
"4 But see Mitchell ex rel. Rasmussen v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674, 692 (Ariz. 1987)

(Feldman, Vice C.J., concurring) ("[E]ven where there is unanimity of opinion between
the guardian, the family, and the doctors ... 'substituted judgment' and 'best interest'
decisions [should] be validated by court order."); In re Hamlin, 689 P.2d 1372, 1381
(Wash. 1984) (Rosellini, J., dissenting) ("Where family members all stand to benefit by
termination, they would naturally agree and present a unified front. Moreover, medical
professionals cannot guard against improper motives on the part of the family because
they are neither suited by training nor situation to discover such impropriety.").
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that where "family" is discussed, no particular biological or legal relation
is presumedY 5 The important issue would be whether the person knew
and cared for the patient 27
B. On Court Approval

When deciding whether courts must be consulted before particular
treatment regimens are adopted, at least two competing considerations
arise: (1) the desire to choose the right treatment, and (2) the fact that any
procedure making use of the courts will necessarily be slow!' Further,
the prospect of having to go to court might have a chilling effect on

cessation of treatment even in cases where doing do would not only
fulfill the desires of the patient but would also promote her best

interests!"
Courts have differed about whether judicial approval of termination

of treatment is necessary before such treatment may be implemented2

9

27 According to MEYERS, supra note 14, § 11:6.2, at 225:

So long as the criteria of that person knowing what the patient would have
wanted, if anyone would, and wanting to act out of affection and caring for the
patient in a way consistent with the patient's best interests are met, there is no
reason to restrict either private or court appointed surrogates to members of the
family in all cases.
See Ronzetti, mupra note 58, at 156 ("There is no reason, however, for kinship or
marriage to empower a class of decisionmakers, beyond the intuitive probability that those
related by kinship or marriage are in fact emotionally attached to the patient."). As
Ronzetti continued, id. at 181,
The danger of empowering certain persons as family members is that it may
exclude other 'loved ones' with whom the patient has amutual emotional bond.
This situation occurs primarily in so-called "non-traditional" relationships,
where the loved one was neither married to the patient nor a member of the
patient's conventional family.
See also Hamann, supra note 56, at 169 (arguing that "some persons may not get along

with their families or may have parents who disapprove of their lifestyle').
2'6
See In re Eichner, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517, 548 (App. Div. 1980) (concluding that "an
individual who has known and loved the patient personally, presumably for years, can
best determine what that patient would have wanted under the circumstances").
2' In re Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292, 301 (111. 1989) ("The slow, deliberate nature of
the court system may fiustrate the family and loved ones of the patient.").
' In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 449 (N.J. 1987) ("The mere prospect of a cumbersome,
intrusive and expensive court proceeding, during such an emotional and upsetting period
in the lives of a patient and his or her loved ones, would undoubtedly deter many persons
from deciding to discontinue treatment.").
2" Compare John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921, 925
(Fla. 1984) ("To require prior court approval for termination of the life support systems
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Some suggest that no court approval is necessary unless such parties as
the family, the physician, or the hospital disagree.
This judicial
restraint is recommended both because the family is presumed to be
seeking to promote the wishes and best interests of the patient and,
as a practical matter, because this practice has been common for
28
years.
A related question involves what the court should say when family
members disagree about the appropriate course of action. One district
court analyzing a case in which two parents disagreed about the
appropriate course of treatment for their child wrote: "When one parent
asserts the child's explicit constitutional right to life as the basis for
continuing medical treatment and the other is asserting the nebulous
liberty interest in refusing life-saving treatment on behalf of a minor
child, the explicit right to life must prevail."' Such an analysis implies
that treatment should always be given when there is any disagreement, a
surprising implication if the child's best interests would not thereby be
advanced. In In re Baby Y the husband, the guardian ad litem, and the
hospital all asserted that the anencephalic child's best interests would not
in this type of case is too burdensome, is not necessary to protect the state's interests or
the interests of the patient, and could render the right of the incompetent a nullity:) with
In re AC., 573 A.2d 1235, 1247 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (en banc) ("To protect that right
against intrusion by others - family members, doctors, hospitals, or anyone else, however
well-intentioned - we hold that a court must determine the patient's wishes by any means
available, and must abide by those wishes unless there are truly extraordinary or
compelling reasons to override them.") (emphasis added).
210
Bludworth, 452 So. 2d at 926-27 ("Disagreement among the physicians or family
members or evidence of wrongful motives or malpractice may require judicial intervention
• •.")0; In re Lawrance, 579 N.E.2d 32, 44 (Id. 1991) ("When there is not unanimity
amongst those with tangible professional or personal interest in the patient, the courts ar
available to resolve the dispute if need be."); In re Warren, 858 S.W.2d 263, 265 (Mo.
1993) (concluding that "a guardian has statutory authority to make medical decisions and
consent to medical treatment or the withholding of medical treatment in the best interests
of the ward without specific court authorizatioif'); In re Hamlin, 689 P.2d 1372, 1377

(Wash. 1984) (concluding that guardianship proceedings are not necessary when family
members all agree on the best interests of the patient).
2' Longeway, 549 N.E.2d at 295 ("[Flor many years, members of a patient's family,
together with doctors and clergy, have made decisions to withdraw life-sustaining
equipment from incompetent, hopelessly ill patients without seeking judicial approval").
SSee In re Doe, 418 S.E.2d 3, 7 (Ga. 1992) ("We reject the argument that only the
parent who has given consent [to forego cardiopulmonary resuscitation] may effectively
revoke consent ).
= In re Baby K, 832 F. Supp. 1022, 1031 (E.D. Va. 1993) (emphasis added) (citation
omitted) ("Parents have standing to assert the constitutional rights of their minor
children.").
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be promoted by treatment, because that care would be "futile."'
The
court rejected the claim of futility, arguing that such a holding would
imply that no terminally ill patient should receive treatment.'
The
court apparently did not consider relevant the fact that most anencephalic
children die within days of birth or that the child was permanently
unconscious and could not see, hear, or feel pain. Had the treatment
indeed been futile, the doctor would not have had to perform it.'
Usually, medical personnel rather than courts make the judgment about
which treatments are futile."
When family members are present, it seems safe to assume (absent
evidence to the contrary) that they will protect the patient's interests. If
no family members are present, however, it might be feared that no one
would be looking out for those interests and thus courts should not
presume that the absence of objection implies that the patient's interests
are being protected. For precisely this reason, a guardian will be
appointed to protect the patient's interests where there are no Tamily
members present.'
If the guardian, physicians, and other relevant
hospital personnel (e.g., review committees) all agree that it would be in
the patient's best interest to withhold or withdraw treatment, court
approval will not be necessary and the treatment may be withdrawn.
Whether a stranger or a family member is acting as guardian to protect
the patient's interests, it is not anticipated that there will be many
situations in which there will be disagreements among the relevant
personnel, thus requiring court intervention."
2

"

2s
26

Id. at 1025.
Id. at 1027.

Id. at 1025.

22

See Byrn, supra note 21, at 36 (arguing that "under no circumstances may medical
personnel be required to engage in procedures which are contradicted by reasonable

medical judgment").
" Barber v. Superior Court, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 491 (CL App. 1983) (noting that the

decision about medical futility "is essentially a medical one to be made at a time or on
the basis of facts which will be unique to each case").
2" In re Moorhouse, 593 A.2d 1256, 1261 (N.J. Super. CL App. Div. 1991) (stating

that life support should not be terminated in the absence of family without appointing a
guardian.).
' In re Hamlin, 689 P.2d 1372, 1378 (Wash. 1984) (holding court involvement
unnecessary where all parties agree); In re L.W., 482 N.W.2d 60, 63 (Wis. 1992) (holding
that a guardian may consent to withdrawal of treatment of a patient in a persistent

vegetative state with prior permission from the court if such action is in "best interests"
of patient).
291 In re lobes, 529 A.2d 434, 451 (NJ. 1987) (stating that the
court expected that

such "disagrements [will] be rare and tha intervention seldom will be necessary').
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Currently, it is not always clear which decisions should be made by
guardians and which should be left to the courts. This situation is
unsurprising, given the competing interests at stake. Courts want to
prevent guardians from acting contrary to the desires of the patient, 3
and thus it seems that courts should take a more active oversight role.
However, a long and expensive court proceeding at such a difficult time
hardly seems desirable,2 and thus it seems that courts should take a
more passive role.
Courts and legislatures must clarify what guardians should decide and
what criteria should be used to make those decisions. Further, they must
more clearly specify which decisions do not need court approval, perhaps
taking into account the fact that guardians (especially when not strangers
to the patient) would seem at least as likely as anyone else to look out for
the interests of the patient as anyone elsel s
C. Definition of Death

One of the implicit issues underlying the appropriate treatment of
incompetents is determining when in fact people should be defined as
dead and as thus no longer having rights.' While much debate occurs
regarding what the definition of death ought to be, 7 the current
definition involves whole-brain death. According to this definition, an
individual is dead only if there is no brain activity 2 8 not even of the

2

In re Roe, 421 N.E.2d 40, 51-52 (Mass. 1981) ("There is no bright line dividing

those decisions which are (and ought to be) made by a guardian, from those for which
a judicial determination is necessary.").
2 In re Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 15 (FIa. 1990) ('We cannot ignore the possibility
that a surrogate might act contrary to the wishes of the patient.").
Id. ("Yet, we are loath to impose a cuabersome legal proceeding at such a delicate
time in those many cases where the patient neither needs nor desires additional
protection.").
29
' See Hamann, qmra note 56, at 156-57 (suggesting that right-to-life groups may
undermine the autonomy and best interests of individuals).
2w In re Bowman, 617 P.2d 731, 732 (Wash. 1980) (raising the issue of defining
death and who should determine the criteria).
'" See, e.g., David R. Smith, Legal Recognition of Neocortical Death, 71 COR_ L
L. REV. 850, 872 (1986) CA more just and sensible position is to consider irreversibly
unconscious noncognitive patients legally dead:").
9 John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921, 923 (Fla. 1984)
(holding that person who has "minimal brain functioning" does not "meet the [statutory]
definition of 'brain death"'); see also Sevems v. Wilmington Medical Ctr., Inc., 421 A.2d
1334, 1344 (Del. 1980) (involving a court compelled "to distinguish between 'deafh,'as
we have known it,
and death in which the body lives in some fashion but the brain (or
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brain stem. One doctor who applied the whole-brain death criterion
to his patient concluded that "while Andrew was not dead by the
definition of brain death per se, ... medically speaking he has no
life." ' Advances in medical technology have allowed individuals to be
kept alive even though they cannot feel, think, or perform in a manner
normally associated with living."9
When courts are deciding Whether to allow treatment to be withdrawn
from a patient who is brain dead, they are referring to an individual
whose upper brain is dead but who registers some brain or brainstem
activity.'
This condition can occur because the brain may die in
stages." 3 An individual may have permanently lost the ability to think
and feel while retaining the ability to breathe spontaneously and to
maintin a pulse. '

a significant part of it) does not"); In re Eichner, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517, 529 (App. Div.
1980) ("Since Brother Fox's EEG showed 'minimalactivity,' he did not meet the criteria
of 'brain death' at the time of the hearing.").
I In re Ban-y, 445 So. 2d 365, 369 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that the
patient did not meet Florida's definition of brain dead "because there i a minimal
function of his brain stem"); see also In re T.A.C.P., 609 So. 2d 588, 595 (Ha. 1992)
(suggesting that anaencephalics are not dead according to the accepted standard); People
v. Eulo, 482 N.Y.S.2d 436, 445 (App. Div. 1984) ("Considering death to have occurred
when there is an irreversible and complete cessation of the functioning of the entire brain,
including the brain stem, is consistent with the common-law conception of death.").
30 Barry, 445 So. 2d at 370.
301 As the court explained in Gray ex rel. Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580, 584
(D.R.I. 1988):
Due to advances in medical care, it is possible in some circumstances to sustain
the body's biological functions for extended periods of time while the patient
has no sense of pain or pleasure, fear or joy, love or hate, understanding or
appreciation, taste or touch or smell or any other aspect of life's experience,
with no realistic possibility of sentient life.
"2 Vogel v. Forman, 512 N.Y.S.2d 622, 624 (App. Div. 1986) (referring to
individuals "who are brain-dead or terminally ill, without hope of recovery and are being
kept alive solely by use of artificial means made available by the techniques of modem
medicine and technology").
30 According to one commentator:.
The brain dies in stages, depending on degree and duration of oxygen
deprivation. The upper brain, site of the highest centers of intelligence,
conscious thought, and emotion, dies first. The cortex or neocortex will die
within four to six minutes if deprived of oxygenated blood flow. The brain stem
or medull, which controls respiration and other vegetative bodily functions, can
survive substantially longer.
MEYERS, supra note 14, § 2:2, at 12.
3
"4Id. § 4:2, at 25 ("A patient may well be rendered unconscious, and incapable of
recovering consciousness and any capacity for thought, emotion, and intellectual
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One reason sometimes offered to justify using whole-brain death as
the criterion for death involves a fear of misdiagnosis.) 5 Some commentators suggest that it is better to err on the safe side.' Whole-brain
f ' is the preferred criterion because this standard greatly reduces
death
the possibility of mistake."' Yet, if proper procedures are followed,
misdiagnosis of death can be overcome." 9 Further, if higher-brain death
is the "appropriate" criterion,10 then other ways exist to ensure that the
relevant criteria would be appropriately applied - for example, by
creating liability for their misapplication. Finally, an analogous argument

can be made with respect to any set of criteria: if the relevant procedures
are not going to be followed, then any definition is fallible"
A variety of courts and commentators suggest that not medically
treating someone who is permanently unconscious and cannot feel would

perception, but may have the ability to spontaneously breathe and maintain pulse and
circulation."); id. § 4:9, at 22 ("While a patient who has lost all -upperbrain function will
be in a persistent vegetative state without self-awareness or perception of surroundings,
that patient still has a fictioning brain stem which can carry out certain metabolic
functions, including respiration and circulation, and is not brain dead by any definition.").
3- See VEATCH, supra note 181, at 41 (noting that under some medical standards used
to determine brain death, some patients recover consciousness).
" WALTON, supra note 26, at 82 (advocating "stick[ing] to the safer, known way in
the absence of the highest probability for proceeding otherwise").
3- Smith, supra note 297, at 850-51 ("'Whole brain death' means the irreversible
cessation of all functions of the entire brain, including the brain stem. 'Neocortical death'
means the irreversible loss of consciousness and cognitive fictions.").
31 See id. at 860.
309But see WALTON, supra note 26, at 73 (arguing that "no matter how perfect any
set of criteria is, misapplication of the criteria, through haste or for whatever cause, is
always possible").
311 VEATCH, supra note 181, at 22 ('If a person is dead when and only when there
is an irreversible loss of consciousness and ability to interact socially, then it makes no
sense to pronounce him dead on some other basis."); WALTON, supra note 26, at 53
(arguing that 'irreversibly persistent and permanent vegetative states could be diagnosed
with a degree of confidence and certainty, reasonably adequate to satisfy ethical standards,
then.. . such persons may be considered dead"); Shoff D. Olinger, Medical Death, 27
BAYLOR L. REV. 22, 23 (1975) ("[Human life is, in its essential nature, the sum product
of these phenomenon of consciousness, awareness, memory, emotion and anticipation.
There is no human life in the absence of these."); Ronzetti, supra note 58, at 201 ("A
neocortical definition of death seems preferable to a whole-brain basis of death because
the higher function of the brain - human consciousness - seems to be the sina qua non
of humanity.'); Scher, sopra note 206, at 688 ("Life is most essentially consciousness.
With such consciousness gone forever, all that is left of life is a piece of respiring
matter.").
31 MYERS, supra note 14, § 4:3, at 32 (arguing that "clinical criteria alone may not
be sufficient to diagnose brain death accurately in difficult cases").
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not rob the individual of anything of value. 3 2 Yet ff the person is
alive, then such a policy would seem to contradict the state's interest in
promoting the sanctity of life, 13 depending on what the sanctity of life
includes.314 If individuals with no higher brain functioning are going to
be defined as dead, then that fact should be made clear. If they are
considered to be alive, however, then courts should take great care when
explaining why the removal of treatment is appropriate. For example, the
courts should make clear whether the withdrawal of treatment is based on

a substituted judgment or on a best interests analysis. If the latter, then
the courts should make clear whether the withdrawal is appropriate
because the patient's values so indicate or because society's values so
indicate. If it is because society's values so indicate, then "objective" best
interests analysis would seem to imply that such patients have no more
interests than patients with no brain activity,315 except perhaps an
interest in having treatment continued if they had previously manifested
316
a desire to have treatment in such a condition.
" See John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921, 923 (Fla.
1984) (noting that procedures which "sustain ... vital bodily functions ... can be
accurately described as a means of prolonging the dying process rather than a means of
continuing life"); In re Doe, 418 S.E.2d 3, 6 (Ga. 1992) (noting that "the life support
system was prolonging her death, rather than her life"); In re Dinnerstein, 380 N.E.2d
134, 137-38 (Mass. App. Ct. 1978) ("'Prolongation of life'contemplates, at the very least,
a remission of symptoms enabling a return towards a normal, fnmctioning, integrated
existence.). Cf. MEYERS, supra note 14, § 12:29, at 373 ("Whether the decision is to
commence, continue, or terminate freatment, it seems quality of life is the fundamental
determinant where prognosis is negative. Courts would be honest to recognize this.");
Robertson, siqura note 25, at 1157-58 ("Nontreatment leading to total brain death would
not deprive her of anything of value to her because she had already lost the experiences
and capacities that make life a good for persons.").
"3 KURSE, supra note 13, at 15-16 ("On the sanctity-of-life view, it would, for
example, be just as wrong to terminate the life of a permanently comatose patient as it
would be to take the life of a conscious or self-conscious human being.').
34 See CAULAHAN, supra note 65, at 179-80 ("The 'sanctity of life' has to be the
sanctity of personhood, not merely the possession of a body ... [and] must at least
encompass the capacity to reason, to have emotions, and to enter into relationships with
others."); RACMEIS, supra note 123, at 5 (discussing the difference between having a life

and being alie).

3- Thus, it is not clear that commentators who criticize defining these live" people
as dead are really offering much of an alternative. See Alexander M. Capron & Leon R.
Kass, A Statutory Definition of the Standards for Determining Human Death. An
Appraisal and a Prtposal, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 87, 115 (1972) ("The condition of
'neocortical death' may well be a proper justification for interrupting all forms of
treatment and allowing these patients to die, but this moral and legal problem cannot and
should not be settled by 'defining' these people 'dead."').
316 See Mack v. Mack, 618 A.2d 744, 759-60 (Md. 1993) (discussing the importanc
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Someone who had previously requested that treatment be continued
even if he had no brain activity would not have his wishes followed
should that eventuality occur. If patients in a permanent vegetative state
objectively have no interests, then it is unclear what advantage is gained
by not saying that they are dead and, further, why previously expressed
wishes to 7be maintained in a permanent vegetative state should be
31
respected
If courts are clear about why treatment may be withdrawn in such
cases, then inappropriate withdrawals will be much less likely to occur.
For example, if treatment may be withdrawn from patients in a permanent
vegetative state only when doing so would be in accord with their own
former preferences or values, then there would be no de facto equivalence
between higher brain death and death simpliciter. f however, the reason
treatment may be withdrawn is that such patients "objectively" have no
interests, then courts and commentators must explain why people with no
brain functioning cannot have their treatment continued in accord with
their previously expressed preferences but people with merely no higher
brain functioning can.31
It is important to recognize that someone who only has brainstem
activity may "live" for an extended period. If terminal illness is defined
in terms of when the patient will die - for example, in six montht
- then a patient in a permanent vegetative state need not be terminally ill.
Terminal illness does not have to be defined in terms of when the
patient is expected to die." ° Instead, it may be defined in terms of
whether the individual has any cognitive functioning " and whether the
of self-determination and its conflict with best interests analysis); see also In re Conroy,
486 A.2d 1209, 1232 (NJ. 1985) ("[L]ife sustaining treatment should not be withdrawn

from an incompetent patient who had previously expressed a wish to be kept alive in spite
of any pain he might experience.").
..Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626, 645 (Mass. 1986)

(advocating termination decisions consistent with the patient's "view respecting a
personally preferred manner of concluding life").
.1 See Alvarado v. New York City Health Hosps. Corp., 547 N.Y.S.2d 190, 195

(1984) (discussing the loss of higher brain function).
"t See McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617, 630 (Nev. 1990) (noting that a patient is
non-terminal if his life expectancy is six months or greater); see also CUNDiFF, supra note
37, at 62 (stating that hospice benefits require a prognosis of less than six months).
Mayo, supra note 26, at 136 ("'Terminal condition' is, of course, a nontechnical
term that is capable of being infused with different meanings.").
3
aSee also Karen TeeL, The Physician's Dilemma A Doctor's riew: What the Law
Should Be, 27 BAYLOR L. REv. 6, 7-8 (1975) (using examples of inlants with varying
degrees of cognitive capabilities to illustrate terminal illness); f Drabick v. Drabick, 245
Cal. Rptr. 840, 852 (Ct App. 1988) (holding that the medical advice that would support
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person is only able to live on artificial life support.' However, with
these kinds of definitions, one could be "terminally ill" for years.' Not
only does this result seem to be an abuse of language, but it also will
have treatment option implications.
Courts and legislatures sometimes limit certain treatment options to
those who are terminally ill.' Such a limitation merely invites individuals to redefine "terminally ill" so that patients will have a greater
nunber of options even if in fact their prognosis is greater than six
months.' Even if this redefinition problem could be avoided, however,
there are other difficulties with limiting treatment options to those who
are terminally ill. As a practical matter, it may not always be easy to tell
who in fact will die in six months." Further, there seems to be no
principled reason to allow one with an expectancy of less than six months
to die,327 while not affording that same option to one with a longer
expectancy.'
The person who is suffering great pain and who is
expected to live for more than six months would seem to have at least as

a decision to terminate life support "must include the prognosis that there is no reasonable
possibility of returning to -cognitive and sapient life").
3a See In re Ban-y, 445 So. 2d 365, 370 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (considering child
in "permanent vegetative coma without any cognitive brain function" to be terminally ill).
m3See Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., 497 N.E.2d 626, 630 (Mass. 1986)
(concluding that patient "may live in a persistent vegetative state for several years").
'2 In re Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292, 298 (Ill
1989) (holding that "an incompetent
patient must be terminally ill before this right to refuse artificial sustenance may be
exercised"); see also KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 311.635(1) (MichielBobbs-Merrnill 1994)
(holding individuals who authorize in good faith the withholding of treatment from a
terminally ill patient in accord with an advance directive immune from liability); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.58.8(A)(1) (West 1992) (holding medical personnel who
withhold or withdraw life support from a qualified patient who has a terminal and
irreversible condition immune from liability). But see Bartling v. Superior Court, 209 Cal.
Rptr. 220, 223 (Ct.App. 1984) (concluding that "the trial court was incorrect when it
held that the right to have life-support equipment disconnected was limited to comatose,
terminally ill patients or representatives acting on their behalf').
'Some jurisdictions define terminal illness in terms of a prognosis of no more than
a year of life. See, e.g., In re CA., 603 N.E.2d 1171, 1174 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992). Others
merely say that the last stage of illness is determinative as to the definition of terminal
illness. See, e.g., McConnell v. Beverly E
rises-Connem
ticut 553 A.2d 596, 604
(Conn. 1989).
3mSee CUNDIFF, supra note 37, at 62 (dsussing difficulties in predicting how long
patients will live).
See McKay v. Bergstedt 801 P.2d 617, 630-31 (Nev. 1990).
32 Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 302 (Ct. App. 1986) (concluding
that "there is no practical or logical reason to limit the exercise of this right to 'terminal'
patients").
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If compemuch of a need for the option of death or nontreatment.
tents and incompetents are to be treated equally, then nonterminal
incompetents cannot be precluded from exercising their rights to refuse
treatment when nonterminal competents are not so precluded.'
D. Liability
Any policy regarding treatment or nontreatment of patients must
address issues of legal liability.3"' Doctors and hospitals may be
dissuaded from withholding or withdrawing treatment if they might face
liability as a result. Furthermore, even if they are granted immunity from
liability, they may have no incentive to act in accord with the patient's
wishes unless they are subjected to sanctions for failing to do so.
Where all interested parties agree with respect to whether to treat and
that judgment is in accord with reasonable medical judgment, no issues
of liability are raised.33 Further, if treatment is withdrawn because all
parties agree but one of the family members changes her mind after death
has occurred, courts will hold the hospital and medical personnel
blameless.333 However, disagreement among the parties may occur at
the outset because the patient; through her guardian, wants treatment
withdrawn, but the physician or hospital refuses.'
Suppose that a patient had clearly expressed her wishes not to have
treatment continued should she have no hope of recovery. Suppose further
that the hospital has a policy of continuing treatment even in such
situations. If the hospital has not made its policy clear to the patient and
her family beforehand, the hospital may be forced to accede to the
family's wishes.33 At the very least, the hospital may be forced to

3

Smith, supra note 13, at 414 ("What of the nontenninal yet severely suffering

patient who can expect little more than years of suffering, incapacitation and personal
degradation ... ? Surely, she should have the same rights of self-determination as other

less-aflicted citizens.").
See In re Farrell, 529 A.2d 404, 410 (N.L. 1987).
See Nancy K. Rhoden, reatment Dilemmasfor ImperiledNewborns: Why Quality
ofLife Counts, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 1283, 1346 (1985) (discussing the impact of liability
on physicians' behavior).
' See In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 451 (implying that courts will not be involved
'3o

33

where the parties agree).
' See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.635(1) (Michie/Bobbs-Menill 1994); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.58.8(A)(1) (West 1992).
" See, e.g., Gray ex rel. Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580 (D.R.I. 1988); Jobes, 529
A.2d 434.
3 35
' Jobes, 529 A.2d at 450 (involving a nursing home which, in the absence of any
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transfer the
patient, assumning that another facility is willing to take the
spatient
Doctors who object to withholding life-sustaining treatment will not
be forced to do so. 3 7 However, they may not be allowed to treat's
but instead, may have to transfer the patient to another physician.339
A hospital or doctor might refuse to withdraw treatment for any of
a number of reasons, including religious reasons or perceived best
interests of the patient. Yet, the hospital might also be inclined to refuse
to withdraw treatment because it wants to continue to receive payments
from the patient. Arguably, medical personnel, hospitals, and nursing

formal policy on artificial feeding, was forced to defer to the choice of medical treatment
made by the patient's family).
See Gray, 697 F. Supp. at 591 (holding that a hospital which did not alert the
patient's family of its policy on life-sustaining treatment must either transfer the patient
to another hospital or accede to the patient's wishes). As one court discussed such a
situation:
In view of (1) the hospital staff's personal moral objections to removing the
tube, (2) the evidence that [the patient] could be transferred to another local
facility within two weeks, (3) the hospital's willingness to transfer [the patient]
at no expense to her or [the conservator], and (4) [the conservator's] failure to
show that no physician could be found who would follow her direction, there
was no basis for the court to require the hospital to remove the tube.
Childs v. Ambramovice, 253 Cal. Rptr. 530, 535 (Ct App. 1988)
13
Berger, s!tpra note 264, at 140 ("Many statutes also do not make it mandatory for
physicians or health care facilities to honor the patient's wishes as expressed in a living
will. Such statutes impose no penalties on a physician who refuses to follow the
declaration.!); Delgado, supra note 123, at 487 (noting that "the physician is not
compelled to euthanize anyone, but is merely protected from crimial sanctions ifhe does

so').
" See In re Gardner, 534 A.2d 947, 951 (Me. 1987) (noting that "when a competent
patient has expressly refused to receive some form of medical care, a doctor would be
acting tortiously if he insisted on providing the treatment against his patient's will");
Strand, supra note 59, at 486 ("If the physician ignores the expressed desires of his
patient and administers unwanted treatment, he may be civilly and criminally liable for
assault and battery.").
39 Childs, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 534 ("[A] physician has the right to refuse on personal
moral grounds to follow a conservator's direction to withhold life-sustaining treatment, but
must be willing to transfer the patient to another physician who will follow the
conservator's direction."); see also id. at 531 ("[A] conservator can authorize the removal
of a nasogastric feeding tube from a conservatee ... but cannot require physicians to
remove the tube against their personal moral objections if the patient can be transferred
to the care of another physician who will follow the conservator's direction."); Berger,
szqra note 264, at 140 ("All that most statutes require is that if physicians are not willing
to comply with a living will, they take reasonable steps to transfer the patient to another
physician.).
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homes would be less likely to give unnecessary care if they could not
force the family or estate to pay for that care.3'
It may be feared that making the caregiver responsible for unwanted
and unnecessary care might induce the caregiver to be too ready to follow
the commands of the guardian." Further, when a guardian makes a
decision, it is not as if the patient herself had refused treatment. Rather,
the guardian is asserting the patient's right for her, with all of the
uncertainty attendant on having someone else speak for the patient.
Arguably, the guardian's directions may be ignored as a way of protecting
the patient's autonomy, and the family should then have to pay for the
care which the guardian rejected.
Yet, this rationale for forcing the patient or her family to pay for
unwanted care should be rejected for several reasons. 2 First, even
where the patient had made clear her wishes in a living will, those wishes
are all too often being ignored. 3 It simply is not credible to claim that

a patient must be treated despite her wishes to the contrary out of a
concern for her autonomy. Second, even where no living will is present,
the guardian is the person who is presumed to be representing the
intentions and best interests of the patient.'

Indeed, the patient may

have chosen the proxy decisionmaker precisely because certain decisions
cannot be included in a living will, either because of the difficulties in

explicitly and precisely covering all the relevant possibilities3"

or

See Grace Plaza of Great Neck, Inc. v. Elbaum, 588 N.Y.S.2d 853, 860 (App. Div.
1992) (Rosenblatt, J., dissenting) (noting that "the majority's decision enables musing
homes to cany out their own policies regarding the prolongation of artificial life support,
even ifthose policies are founded on motives and interests that are diametrically opposed
to the wishes of the patient").
34
Id. As one court explained. "[Health care providers would have an additional
financial incentive to obey, without question, the orders of those conservators who mig
prematurely despair of their conservatee's recovery, or the orders of those conservators
whose judgment might be tainted by motives less altruistic than Mr. Elbaum's." Id.
342 See, e.g., Ebaum, 588 N.Y.S.2d at 856 ("The rule which prevents physicians from
recovering payment for medical services which are not desired... should not be applied
in cases where, because the patient is comatose, her desires cannot be known, but can
only be deduced, with a greater or lesser degree of certainty, from evidence of her past
conduct and past statements.") (citation omitted).
- CALLAHAN, supra note 65 ("A continuing problem with 'living wills' has been the
unwillingness of many physicians to honor them....").
3" See In re Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 15 (Fla. 1990) (noting that "when the patient
has taken the time and the trouble to specifically express his or her wishes for future
health care in the event of later incapacity, the surrogate need not obtain prior judicial
approval to can-y out those wishes").
" See American Bar Ass'n, supra note 64, at 29-30.
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because those decisions legally cannot be covered by a living will.'
Allowing the guardian's directions to be ignored out of a alleged concern
for the patient's autonomy may well involve ignoring the only way that
the patient's autonomy could be represented.
While physicians and hospitals cannot be required to give unreasonable medical care (thus providing a check on unreasonable requests by a
guardian), they cannot be given the option to ignore a patient's or
guardian's directives whenever they so choose." It is bad enough that
the patient may have had her autonomy denied and, perhaps, may have
been forced to have painful, unwanted treatment. It adds insult to
injury to then demand that the individual (or her estate) pay for such
treatment.
Physicians who follow the dictates of a living will will be protected
as long as they act in good faith.' By the same token, a physician
should be immune from liability if she treats in good faith - for example,
because she neither knows nor could have reasonably known about the
existence of a living will or because the competence of the guardian is
itself at issue. ' However, where the patient had explicitly directed that
no treatment be given in the existing circumstances or the guardian
(whose competence or objectivity is not at issue) reasonably decides that
treatment should be withheld, courts should neither provide nor recognize
immunity for the knowing failure to respect those wishes. Even if "life
is not a compensable harm,"' the patient should be compensated for
the denial of autonomy and the possible pain and suffering caused by
unwanted treatment.3 5'

' In re Greenspan, 558 N.E.2d 1194, 1200-01 (I1. 1990) (suggesting that under the
relevant living will statute, nutrition and hydration may not be withdrawn unless done so

at the direction of a guardian).
''

Hummel v. Reiss, 608 A.2d 1341, 1350 (NJ. 1992) ("Neither physicians nor

hospitals may override or ignore the choices of patients or their guardians. ..
' See AIA. CODE § 22-8A-7 (1990); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7190.5 (West
Supp. 1995); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.635(2) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1994); 20 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5407 (1994); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2988 (Michie 1994).
' See John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921, 926 (Fla.
1984) ("To be relieved of potential civil and criminal liability, guardians, consenting
family members, physicians, hospitals or their administrators need only act in good

faith.").
" See Anderson v. St. Francis-St. George Hosp., 614 N.E.2d 841, 845 (Ohio Ct. App.
1992) (holding that "life is not a compensable harm; therefore, there is no cause of action
for wongfu living').
..C. Holmes v. Silver Cross Hosp., 340 F. Supp. 125, 130 (N.D. l. 1972) (noting

that compensation will not automatically be awarded but depends on a balancing of such
factors as the amount of support the dependents received from the decedent).
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In other contexts, a physician who treats without getting consent from
the patient or guardian or without getting authorization from a court will
be subject to liability.2 Having a different policy in a context implicating such fundamental personal values involved in the choice of how and
when one should die is entirely inappropriate. If indeed competents and
incompetents are entitled to the same rights, then it is hard to understand
why a physician who intentionally or negligently ignores the wishes of
a competent patient is liable but a physician who intentionally or
negligently ignores the wishes of an incompetent patient is not.s 3
Further, if the provision of nutrition and hydration is considered a form
of medical treatmen4' then there is no rational basis upon which this
differential treatment could be based.
CONCLUSION

Although incompetents are said to have the same rights as competents, the rationales underlying how and when those rights can be
implemented are hopelessly confused. Substituted judgment may be used
for individuals who have always had the mentality of an infant but need
not be used for someone a month short of majority. The best interests test
may involve an objective assessment (despite the lack of a consensus
about which values are appropriately considered and about the weight to
be given to each value) or a subjective assessment employing the patient's
own values. Given the lack of clarity regarding the appropriate rationales,
it is unsurprising that the guardian's role itself is unclear.
" Wall v. Brim, 138 F.2d 478, 481 (5th Cir. 1943) (stating that an operation
"performed without consent, express or implied, is a technical battery or trespass");
Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093, 1100-01 (Kan. 1960) (involving the issue of lack of
informed consent because the risks had not been fully explained to the patient).
3' But see Estate of Leach v. Shapiro, 469 N.E.2d 1047, 1050 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984)
(stating that an incompetent is presumed to consent).
31 See Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 300 (Ct. App. 1986) ("[A]
patient has the right to refuse any medical trealment or medical service, even when such
treatment is labeled 'furnishing nourishment and hydration."'); In re Longeway, 549
N.E.2d 292, 297 (11. 1989) ("[]n Illinois, the common law right to refuse medical
treatment includes under appropriate circumstances, artificial nutrition and hydration.");
In re Lawrance, 579 N.E.2d 32, 39 (Ind. 1991) ("[Ihe administration of artificial
nutrition and hydration ... is medical treatment which can be refused."); Delio v.
Westchester County Medical Ctr., 516 N.Y.S.2d 677, 689 (App. Div. 1987) ("In our
review of the decisions in other jurisdictions we failed to uncover a single case in which
a court confronted with an application to discontinue feeding by artificial means has
evaluated medical procedures to provide nurition and hydration differently fiom other
types of life-sustaining procedures.").
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The paramount consideration in deciding how incompetents should
be treated involves respecting their current (or past) autonomy. Where the
patient has explicitly and specifically made her preferences clear, those
preferences should be respected and, absent reason to invoke a good faith
exception, liability should be imposed for a failure to do so. Where the
guardian explicitly finds that nontreatment would be in accord with the
patient's intention or her best interests and the guardian's good faith is not
doubted, the guardian's finding should be honored unless doing so would
be medically unreasonable.
Physicians who treat or fail to treat should be immune from liability
as long as their decisions to act or refrain from acting are made in good
faith. However, if a physician knowingly or negligently ignores the
specific wishes of the patient as represented through her guardian or
through her living will, then a court should hold such a physician liable,
just as it would if the physician had knowingly or negligently ignored a
competent patient's wishes.
The medical jurisprudence surrounding the care of incompetents must
be changed if incompetents are to be given the respect they deserve. The
substituted judgment and best interests standards must be clarified both
with respect to what they require and to when they should be utilized.
The not unreasonable judgments of guardians must be respected, absent
evidence of bias or other impropriety. Such respect entails that physicians
will be potentially liable for treating a patient whom they knew or should
have known had refused that treatment. Unless these changes are made,
it seems likely that some courts will continue to consider the alleged
wishes of one-year-olds dispositive, while other courts will contime to
ignore the prior explicit directives made by individuals while competent.
This situation cannot help but further erode confidence in the courts and
in the medical profession, a cost which society as a whole, and patients
in particular, can ill afford to bear.

